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The Prosecutor's Duty To Truth

Years ago, when I became a prosecutor, I was trained to believe that you never
put a defendant to trial unless you were personally convinced of his guilt. This
was, as I recall, the accepted ethos in our office and, I assumed, in prosecutors'
offices generally.' I never questioned that precept. Some years later, however, I
had an opportunity to test it when I prepared to go to trial in a robbery case. The
defendant, a twenty-year-old black man, was accused of robbing at gunpoint a
seventy-seven-year-old white man in a housing project. The complainant
identified the defendant from photographs and later picked him out from a lineup
containing two other persons, one of whom was a police officer known to the
complainant. There was no other evidence.
In readying the case for trial, I learned that the defendant had been getting into
trouble ever since he had dropped out of high school. He had been arrested
several times, but the charges had been dismissed. He had acquired a reputation
with the Housing Police, who frequently picked him up for questioning. He had
been convicted of robbery two years earlier and had served three months in
prison. Several days after he came home, the Housing Police picked him up again
in connection with the present robbery. He had been in jail for the past fourteen
months awaiting trial.
I was concerned about the reliability of the identification. In addition to the
suggestive lineup, the complainant's initial description of the defendant - he
told the police that his assailant was about five feet four inches tall - differed
markedly from the defendant's actual height of six feet two inches. I interviewed
the complainant and questioned him closely. He was an intelligent man who gave
a convincing account of the event. A jury, I thought, would probably believe him.
I went to the vestibule where the crime occurred; it was well-lit, a circumstance
supporting the accuracy of the identification. I talked to the janitor who had
initially called the police and to several tenants. I learned nothing useful. The
defendant's lawyer protested his client's innocence, but offered no alibi. Lacking

* Professor of Law, Pace Law School. I would like to thank Adele Bernhard, David Dorfrnan, Steven
Goldberg, Vanessa Merton, John Humbach, Steven Zeidrnan, and especially Lissa Griffin, for their thoughtful
comments.
1 . I served as an Assistant in the Office of Frank S. Hogan, District Attorney for New York County, from
1966 to 1972, and as a Special Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Maurice H. Nadjari, Deputy Attorney
General for New York State, from 1973 to 1976.
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corroboration of the complainant's identification and aware of the inherent
dangers of eyewitness identifications, I suggested that the defendant take a lie
detector test. He passed.
The day before trial, I asked the complainant to come to my office. I asked
him to look at a series of about twenty photographs of similarly appearing
males that I spread out on my desk. I had the investigator place two
photographs of the defendant in the array. I left my office, asking the
complainant to examine the photographs carefully and pick out the man who
robbed him. When I returned five minutes later, he had selected a photograph
of someone else; he was sure that was the person. I asked him to do it again.
Again he picked out someone else. I thanked him. I explained to him that I
could not prosecute the case. As I recall, he seemed to understand. My bureau
chief concurred. I prepared a motion to dismiss, which the judge, expressing
some reluctance, granted.2
Some years later, now a law professor, and increasingly exposed to academic
perspectives on the ethical responsibilities of "virtuous" prosecutor^,^ I was
surprised to learn that several of these commentators believe that it is not the
prosecutor's function to make a personal evaluation of the truth; it is the jury's
functiom4 Offering a hypothetical one-eyewitness-identification case strikingly
similar to my own robbery case, one influential author asked rhetorically how a
conscientious prosecutor could ever rationally reach the "extra-judicial judg-

2. The case is reported in Joel Dreyfuss, An Innocent Man S 14 Lost Months, N . Y. POST,June 3, 1971, at 5.
3. See H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance From the
ABA, 71 MICH.L. REV. 1145 (1973); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual
Framework, 15 AM.J. CRIM.L. 197 (1988). See also Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice?",
26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 607 (1999); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND.L. REV.45 (1991).
4. The seminal article is Uviller, supra note 3, at 1159 ("[Wlhen the issue stands in equipoise in
his own mind, when he is honestly unable to judge where the truth of the matter lies, I see no flaw in
the conduct of the prosecutor who fairly lays the matter before the judge or jury"). But see H.
Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit,
68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1695, 1703 (2000) ("The prosecutor should be assured to a fairly high degree of
certainty that he has the right person."). See also Fisher, supra note 3, at 230 n. 144 ("The prevailing view,
at least in the world of practice, surely permits prosecutors to [proceed absent personal belief in the
defendant's guilt]."); Zacharias, supra note 3, at 94 (suggesting that "prosecutors need not act as judges of
their witness's testimony unless they are sure the witness is falsifying facts"). For contrary views, see
MONROEH. FREEDMAN,
LAWYERS'ETHICSIN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM88 (1975) (criticizing Professor
Uviller's approach and maintaining that "[a] prosecutor should be professionally disciplined for
proceeding with prosecution if a fair-minded person could not reasonably conclude, on the facts known to
the prosecutor, that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."); John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial
Discretion - A Comment, 6 0 NW. U.L. REV. 174, 178 (1965) (discussing his experience as an Assistant
United states Attorney, the author states: "The great majority, if not all, of the assistants felt that it was
morally wrong to prosecute a man unless one was personally convinced of his guilt."); Whitney North
Seymour, Jr., Why Prosecutors Act Like Prosecutors, 11 REC.A.B. CITYN.Y. 302, 312-13 (1956) (noting
that the "decision [to prosecute] is reached only after we have satisfied ourselves of the defendant's actual
guilt").
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ment" that the witness is ~nreliable.~
The prosecutor's ethical obligations are
satisfied, according to this view, if he apprises the court or defense counsel of
adverse evidence or defects in the truthfulness of his witne~ses.~
My unease with this agnostic approach might have remained dormant were it
not for recent events and disclosures that invite, if not compel, a re-examination
of the question of the prosecutor's obligation to the truth. It has always been my
belief that the prosecutor, more than any other government official, possesses the
greatest power to take away a person's liberty or life at his discretion.' Also, it is

5. See Uviller, supra note 3, at 1157-58 ("Indeed, should the conscientious prosecutor set himself the arduous
task of deciding whether in this instance the complainant is right? If it is his duty to do so, how does he rationally
reach a conclusion? For this purpose, are his mental processes superior to the jurors' or the judge's?').
6. See id. at 1159. In this Article, I make no pretense to try to grapple with the epistological meaning of
"truth." See SISSELABOK, LYING5 (1989) ("'Truth' - no concept intimidates and yet draws thinkers so
powerfully. From the beginnings of human speculation about the world, the questions of what truth is and
whether we can attain it have loomed large."). My reference to "truth" in criminal law includes two separate
concepts - the "factual truth" and the "legal truth." See Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and
Facrfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083, 1084-87 (1975) (discussing difference between factual truth,
which includes external facts derived from witness's sensory experience and internal facts relating to aspects of
defendant's knowledge and volition, and legal truth, which includes the.need to assess the external and internal
facts in light of the legal appropriate standard). For purposes of my discussion, factual truth includes all of the
operative facts probative of the historical criminal event, including external and internal facts; legal truth is the
legal consequence of those facts. Neither of these truths, of course, is ever free of ambiguity or obscurity, even
in the best circumstances. It is rarely possible for a prosecutor or anyone else to ever h o w the "whole truth," but
a prosecutor should have some degree of confidence in the factual and legal truth of his case before proceeding
to trial. The focus of this Article is to assess the level of confidence that a prosecutor should possess before
proceeding with a case.
So, for example, in a murder case, factual truth would include all of the facts and circumstances relevant to
the defendant's act of killing. Some of these facts may be unknown or disputed, such as whether the defendant
had been drinking prior to the encounter, whether he canied a gun with him or went home to retrieve it, and
whether the victim attacked him first. The critical factual question would be the defendant's mental state at the
moment of the killing: did he kill from rage, from drink, in self-defense, or from a premeditated design? Only an
answer to the latter question would determine the legal truth, namely, whether the defendant is guilty of first
degree murder, some lesser degree of homicide, or not guilty. The prosecutor's duty to truth embraces both the
factual and legal truth.
For recent illustrations of problems encountered by prosecutors in ascertaining the truth, see James Sterngold,
Nuclear Scientist Set Free After Plea in Secrets Case, N.Y. TIMES,Sept. 14, 2000, at A1 (judge accuses
prosecution of presenting false and misleading evidence that defendant engaged in conduct that posed threat to
national security); Katherine E. Finkelstein, Prosecutors Detail Evidence Leading to Suspect's Release, N.Y.
TIMES,July 27, 2000, at B3 (noting that despite defendant's confession and two eyewitness identifications,
prosecutor claims police arrested wrong man); Kevin Sack & David Firestone, Tough Times for Prosecutor In
an Atlanta Murder Trial, N.Y. TIMES,June 7,2000, at A20 (recounting how the prosecution against professional
football star Ray Lewis crumbled as witnesses changed stories); Alan Feuer, OlgicerS Role in Louima Case
Elusive, Even After Verdicts, N.Y. TIMES,Mar. 8,2000, at B 1 (describing the "frustrating sense that the truth cold and hard and clean - remains elusive" after two federal trials of three New York City police officers
charged with assaulting a prisoner, Abner Louima, and then attempting to cover up their misconduct); see also
United States v. Volpe, 62 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying motion to set aside verdict in Louima case
based on factual insufficiency).
7. See Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 813 (1987) ("Between the private life of the citizen and the
public glare of criminal accusation stands the prosecutor. That state official has the power to employ the full
machinery of the state in scrutinizing any given individual."); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1555 (1981) ("Giving prosecutors the power to invoke or deny
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becoming increasingly clear that the criminal justice system often miscarries,
almost always with tragic r e ~ u l t sNumerous
.~
documented instances of wrongful
convictions, particularly in death penalty cases, have heightened concern about
the ability of the criminal trial process to produce truthful result^.^ The Governor
of Illinois recently called for a moratorium on executions after thirteen men on
death row were proven innocent.'' Of the 6,000 people sent to death row since
1973, eighty-four of them have been exonerated." According to a U.S.
Department of Justice report, at least fifty-five defendants who were convicted
and incarcerated for lengthy periods have been exonerated by DNA evidence.I2A

punishment at their discretion raises the prospect that society's most fundamental sanctions will be imposed
arbitrarily and capriciously and that the least favored members of the community - racial and ethnic minorities,
social outcasts, the poor - will be treated most harshly."). There is a vast amount of scholarship on the
GOLDSTEIN,
THEPASSIVEJUDICIARY:
PROSECUTORIAL
prosecutor's exercise of discretion. See, e.g., ABRAHAM
DISCRETION
AND THEGUILTYPLEA (1981); FRANKW. MILLER,PROSECUTION:
THE DECISION
TO CHARGE
A
SUSPECTWITHA CRIME(1970); Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in rhe United States, 18 AM. J.
COMP.L. 532 (1970); Charles Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI.L. REV. 427 (1960);
see also Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard For the Prosecuror's Exercise of the Charging Discrefion, 20
FORDHAM
URB. L. J. 513, 513 (1993) ("[Nlo subject in criminal law is as elusive as that of prosecutorial
discretion in the charging process.").
8. See, e.g., JAMESLIEBMAN,
JEFFREYFAGAN& VALERIE
WEST,A BROKEN
SYSTEM:ERRORRATESIN CAPITAL
CASES,1973-1995, at 5 (2000) (conducting a massive study of every capital punishment case in U.S. between
1973-1995 that documents that the overall error rate in capital punishment system is 68%, and that 82% of all
capital judgments reversed on appeal [247 out of 3011 were replaced on retrial with a sentence less than death, or
no sentence at all); JIM DWYER,PETERNEUFELD& BARRYSCHECK,ACIIJAL INNOCENCE
(2000) (providing a
compendium of anecdotal accounts, and legal and social science scholarship, of miscarriages of justice in
American criminal trials); The Death Penalty in 1999; Year End Report, DEATHPENALTY
INFORMATION
CENTER
1 (2000) (listing eighty-four inmates on Death Row exonerated since 1973); Marty Rosenbaum, Inevitable
Error Wrongful New York State Homocide Convictions, 1965-1988, 18 N.Y.U. REV.L. & SOC.CHANGE
807,
809 (1991) (claiming that New York State leads all states in executing the innocent; eight New Yorkers have
been executed in error); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN.L. REV. 21, 36-37,7 1 (1987) (claiming that more than 350 people in this century have
been erroneously convicted in the U.S. of crimes punishable by death; 116 of those were sentenced to death and
twenty-three actually were executed); Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, THEATLANTIC
MONTHLY,
NOV.1, 1999, at
68 ("[Slurely the number of innocent people discovered and freed from prison is only a small fraction of those
still incarcerated.").
9. See Berlow, supra note 8. See also WILLIAMT. PIZZI, TRIALSWITHOUTTRUTH 3 (1999) (describing
American trial system as structurally flawed by badly overemphasizing winning and losing and undervaluing
truth); Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVISL. REV.95 (1996) (suggesting that
trials are just as likely to hide or corrupt truth as to discover truth).
10. See Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 1, 2000, at Al.
Legislation that would halt executions are pending in twelve other states. Id.
11. See The Death Penalty in 1999: Year End Report, supra note 8.
12. See Recommendations for Handling Applications for Posrconvicrion DNA Testing, NAT'LINST.OF JUST.,
U.S. DEP'TOF JUST.(Draft Report), at 7 (Feb. 1999) ("[Alt least fifty-five convictions in the United States have
been vacated on the basis of DNA results."). See also Edward Connors et al, Convicred by Juries, Exonerated by
Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence Ajier Trial, NAT'LINST.OF JUST.,U.S.
DEP'TOF JUST.(1996) (evaluating twenty-eight cases in which DNA evidence established post-trial innocence).
Congress is presently considering legislation that would mandate free DNA testing on application of a convicted
defendant of any biological material in the government's possession related to the prosecution. See S. 2073,
106th Cong. (2000). One local District Attorney has begun a policy of offering free DNA testing to prison
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recent study reported that convictions in 381 homicide cases nationwide have
been reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence suggesting the defendants' innocence or presented evidence they knew to be false.I3 Misidentifications, false confessions, false testimony of informants and jailhouse "snitches,"
police perjury, and untruthful allegations of child sexual abuse are among the
most frequently cited contributors to wrongful convictions. l4
Curiously, despite extensive documentation of erroneous convictions, widespread prosecutorial abuses that contribute to wrongful convictions, and a
plethora of academic literature on the ethical responsibilities of prosecutor^,'^
there has been little discussion of the prosecutor's legal and ethical duty to
truth.16 As I hope to demonstrate, the prosecutor has a legal and ethical duty to
promote truth and to refrain from conduct that impedes truth. The courts have
explicitly recognized the existence of this duty, l 7 and have implicitly recognized

inmates who claim they were wrongfully convicted and would be exonerated by such testing. See James
Sterngold, Sun Diego District Attorney Offering Free DNA Testing, N.Y. TIMES,July 28,2000, at A12.
13. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win,
CHICAGO
TRIBUNE,
Jan. 10, 1999, at 3.
14. See DWYER,NEUFELD& SCHECK,supra note 8; Bedau & Radelet, supra note 8, at 57 tbl. 6 (listing
coerced or false confessions responsible for erroneous convictions in forty-nine out of 350 miscaniages of
justice in potentially capital cases); Dana D. Anderson, Assessing the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sexual
Abuse Cases, 69 S. CAL.L. REV. 2117,2117 n.1 (1996) (claiming that of the thirty child sexual abuse cases that
went to trial in thq 1980s, more than half of convictions were reversed on appeal for tainted testimony of child
witnesses); Arye kattner, Convicted But Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice System, 12
LAW& HUM. BEHAV.283, 289-92 (1988) (describing a study of more than 200 felony cases of wrongful
conviction that found misidentification to be the single largest source of error, accounting for more than half of
cases that had one main cause). The role of prosecutorial misconduct in contributing to miscarriages of justice is
also well-documented. See LIEBMAN,
FAGAN& WEST,supra note 8, at 5 (noting that prosecutorial suppression of
evidence accounted for 16% to 19% of reversible errors); Armstrong & Possley, supra note 13, at 2 (claiming
381 homicide cases were reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence suggesting defendants' innocence or
presented evidence known to be false); Rosenbaum. supra note 8, at 809 ("[A] substantial number of the
wrongful convictions we have found in New York resulted from prosecutorial misconduct."); Bedau & Radelet,
supra note 8, at 57 (asserting that fifty of the 350 wrongful convictions resulted from prosecutorial suppression
of exculpatory evidence or other overzealous prosecution).
A significant contributor to wrongful convictions is the poor quality of defense lawyering. See, e.g., Stephen
B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not For the Worst Crime But For the Worst Lawyer, 103
YALEL. J. 1835 (1994); Dirk Johnson, Shoddy Defense by Lawyers Puts Innocents on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5,2000, at A l .
15. A recent Westlaw search turned up 178 law review articles in the last five years about prosecutorial ethics
and fourteen law review symposia addressing that subject.
16. But see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. See also DEBORAHL. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY:
ETHICSBYTHEPERVASIVE
METHOD
633 (1998) (inquiring into appropriate standard of proof to
guide prosecutors); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation With Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling
and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 917, 953-57 (discussing attitudes of former federal prosecutors
toward truth as "overriding concern" but "elusive"); David A. Sklansky, Starc Singleton, and the Prosecutor's
Role, 26 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 509, 528-31 (noting failure of Justice Department to assign as a "relevant
consideration" in determining whether to enter into plea agreement with defendant the prosecutor's "degree of
confidence that the witness will testify honestly," and criticizing academic commentators for largely neglecting
discussion of "how prosecutors should exercise the discretion they actually have.").
17. See infra note 38.
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this duty by reversing convictions when a prosecutor engages in conduct that
undermines the search for truth.I8
The prosecutor's duty to the truth arises from several sources. The most important
source is the prosecutor's role as a minister of justice.Ig In this role, the prosecutor has
the overriding responsibility not simply to convict the guilty but to protect the
inn~cent.~'The duty to truth also derives from the prosecutor's constitutional
obligation not to use false evidence or to suppress material evidence favorable to the
defendant.21The duty to truth also arises from various ethical strictures that require
prosecutors to have confidence in the truth of the evidence before bringing or
maintaining criminal charges.22 The duty is found as well in the prosecutor's
domination of the criminal justice system and his virtual monopoly of the fact-finding
process.23More than any other party in the criminal justice system, the prosecutor has
superior knowledge of the facts that are used to convict the defendant, exclusive control
of those
and a unique ability to shape the presentation of those facts to the

18. See infra Parts II(A), II(B), and II(C).
19. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[The prosecutor's] interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."). See also MODELRULESOF
PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.8, cmt. 1 (1983) [hereinafter MODELRULES] (('A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); MODELCODEOF PROFESSIONAL
R E ~ P O N S I BEC
I L 7-13
~
(1981) [hereinafter MODELCODE]("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs
from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); STANDARDS
FORCRIMINAL
JusncE, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-1.2(c) (Am. Bar Ass'n 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA
STANDARDS]
("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.").
20. See ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 19, cmt. at 3-1.2 ("[Ilt is fundamental that the prosecutor's obligation is
to protect the innocent as well as to convict the guilty.").
2 1. See infra Part D(B) and Part II(C).
22. See infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text. Some statutes explicitly require that attorneys be truthful.
See, e.g., GA. CODEANN.5 15-19-4 (1982) (noting the duty of attorneys to employ in litigation "such means
only as are consistent with truth and never seek to mislead the judges or juries by any artifice or false statements
of the law").
23. See YALE KAMISAR,WAYNER. LA FAVE, JEROLDH. ISRAEL,& NANCYKING, MODERNCRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
1205 (9th ed. 1999) (describing prosecutor's domination of criminal justice system, including
investigative manpower of police, investigative legal authority of grand jury and grand jury's subpoena power,
early anival on scene by police when evidence is fresh, and natural inclination of witnesses to cooperate with
police and refuse to cooperate with defense); STEPHEN
A. SALTLBURG
& DANIELJ. CAPRA,AMERICAN
CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
809 (6th ed. 2000) ("[Tlhe prosecutor has become the most powerful office in the criminal justice
system."); BENNETTL. GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
8 4:l ( 2 ED.
~ 1999) ("The prosecutor decides
whether or not to bring criminal charges: who to charge; what charges to bring; whether a defendant will stand
trial, plead guilty, or enter a correctional program in lieu of criminal charges; and whether to confer immunity
from prosecution.").
24. Although there is no constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545,559 (1977), federal and state discovery statutes allow the defense limited access to information in the
prosecutor's possession. See FED. R. C m . P. 16; N.Y. CRIM. P. L., 8 240.20. However, it is commonly
recognized that a defendant's access to information in the prosecution's possession is extremely limited. See
Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More!: The Implications of the Informed Citizen Ideal For Discovery Before
Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 709-13 (1999) ("Pre-trial discovery in
criminal cases is extraordinarily limited."); Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks Wirness Statements:
Timing Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST.U.L. REV. 65 1,652 (1999) ("defendant's criminal discovery is limited").
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fact-finder.25Finally, the prosecutor, in his role as representative of the government, has
a unique power to affect the evaluation of the facts by the fact-finder, who inevitably
views the prosecutor as a special guardian and thus a warranter of the facts -an expert
who can be trusted to use the facts res~onsibly.~~
Part I of this Article discusses the prosecutor's duty to refrain from conduct
that impedes the search for truth." A prosecutor may impede the truth-finding
process in several ways: (1) distorting the truth by attacking the defendant's
character, misleading and misrepresenting facts, and engaging in inflammatory
(2) subverting the truth by making false statements and presenting
false e~idence;'~(3) suppressing the truth by failing to disclose potentially
truth-enhancing evidence or obstructing defense access to potentially truthenhancing e~idence;~'and (4) other truth-disserving conduct that exploits
defense counsel's misconduct and mistakes3' and prevents introduction of
potentially truth-serving defenses.32 Part I also discusses the prosecutor's
affirmative duty to assist the defense in discovering the truth through discovery
rules33and by conferring immunity on potentially truthful defense witnesses.34

25. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
26. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985) ("prosecutor's opinion carries with it the
imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own
view of the evidence"); Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 ("It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or less degree,
has confidence that these obligations [to serve justice] which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will
be faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations and, especially, assertions of personal
knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none."); United
States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (2d Cir. 1981) ('The prosecutor is cloaked with the authority of the
United States Government; he stands before the jury as the community's representative. His remarks are those,
not simply of an advocate, but rather of a federal official duty-bound to see that justice is done . . . [I]t may be
difficult for [the jury] to ignore his views, however biased and baseless they may in fact be.").
27. The search for truth is generally regarded as the touchstone for the adversary system. See Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,681 (1986) ("[Tlhe central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question
of the defendant's guilt or innocence."); Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 91 COLUM.L. REV. 1369, 1372 (1991) ("The theme of accurate adjudication lies at the very heart of
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' vision of constitutional criminal procedure."); Thomas L. Steffen, Truth as
Second Fiddle: Reevaluating the Place of Truth in the Adversarial Trial Ensemble, 4 UTAHL. REV. 799, 804
(1988) ("Simply stated, truth is the sina qua non of justice. If justice is to have meaning beyond that of a hollow
shibboleth, it must reflect a wise and fair application of truth."); Gary Goodpaster, Criminal Law: On the Theory
118, 118 n.1 ("Most adversary system
of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J . CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY
critiques assume that truth-finding is the purpose of the adversary system and challenge it from that point of
view."). But see Barbara A. Babcock Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 34 STAN.L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1982) ("But if the central goal is truth-seeking, why should 'the
prosecutor, with his greater resources and access to witnesses, not have the responsibility for putting all the
evidence on the table, including that which is favorable to the accused?')).
28. See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 57-102 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 103-23 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
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Part I1 of this Article discusses the source and nature of the prosecutor's duty to
prejudge the truth. As explained in Part 11, this duty is based on various legal,
ethical, and practical considerations that require a prosecutor, in effect, to
preempt the jury's determination by making an informal adjudication of the
defendant's guilt and the credibility of witnesses.35 Part I1 also discusses the
methodology used by a prosecutor in malung this prejudgment - by examining
facts skeptically, rigorously testing the hypothesis of guilt, and having the moral
courage to decline prosecution when not personally convinced of the defendant's
guilt.36 Finally, Part 11 describes how an aggressive commitment to truth, rather
than an agnostic approach to truth, will create a prosecutorial culture that is more
compatible with the prosecutor's role as a minister of justice.
Part I11 of the Article concludes that a prosecutor has both a negative duty to
refrain from conduct that impedes the search for truth and an affirmative duty to
protect and promote the search for truth. A prosecutor who proceeds with a case
without being personally convinced of the defendant's guilt violates these duties
and creates an unacceptable risk that an innocent person will be c~nvicted.~'

I. DUTYNOTTO IMPEDETHE TRUTH
1

The courts have recognized that, as a minister of justice, a prosecutor has a
special duty not to impede the truth.38That duty has been recognized implicitly in
cases where courts have reversed convictions when the prosecutor engaged in

35. See infra notes 162-87 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 188-226 and accompanying text.
37. See FREEDMAN,
supra note 4, at 88 ("[A] prosecutor should be professionally disciplined for proceeding
with prosecution if a fair-minded person could not reasonably conclude, on the facts known to the prosecutor,
that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.").
38. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (noting that a prosecutor has "duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction"); Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (noting that a prosecutor "has the unique duty to ensure fundamentally fair trials by seeking not only to
convict, but also to vindicate the truth and to administer justice"), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538 (1998);
United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571, 578 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994) (prosecutor has ''duty to serve and facilitate the
truth-finding function of the courts"); Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538, 1548 n.15 (11th Cir. 1994) ("prosecutors
have a special duty of integrity in theirarguments"); United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993)
("lawyers representing the government in criminal cases serve truth and justice first"); United States v.
Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 162 n.10 (2d Cir. 1994) ("the prosecutor has a special duty not to mislead") (quoting
United States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365. 367 (2d Cir. 1962)); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 301
(2d Cir. 1992) (prosecutor has "duty not to lie").
By contrast, it is generally agreed that defense counsel's ethical duty to represent his client zealously includes
an affirmative duty to impede the search for truth. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-258 (1967)
("defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth. . . . If he can confuse a witness,
even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course.")
G A CRIMINAL
(White, J., concumng); JAMESKUNEN,HOWCANYOUDEFENDTHOSEPEOPLE?THE~ ~ A K I NOF
LAWYER30 (1983) ("defense attorney's job is to keep the truth from coming out, or to keep the jury from
supra note 4, at 75 ("[Tlhere are situations in which it may be proper for
recognizing it if it does."); FREEDMAN,
the attorney to give the client legal advice even though the attorney has reason to believe that the advice may
induce the client to commit perjury."); Goodpaster, supra note 27, at 123 n.15 ("Scholars support the
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conduct that distorted, subverted, or suppressed the truth. In Berger v. United
the seminal case defining the prosecutor's legal and ethical role as a
minister of justice, the Supreme Court implied that the prosecutor's duty to serve
justice includes the avoidance of conduct that deliberately corrupts the truthfinding process.40 The prosecutor's conduct, both in presenting evidence and
argument to the jury, was characterized by the Court as an "evil influence" that
was "calculated to mislead the jury."4' The misconduct during the evidence phase
included: misstating facts during cross-examination; falsely insinuating that
witnesses said things they had not said; representing that witnesses made
statements to him personally out of court when no proof of this was offered;
pretending that a witness had said something which he had not said and
persistently cross-examining him on that basis; and assuming prejudicial facts
not in evidence. The prosecutor's closing argument contained remarks that were
intemperate," "undignified," and "misleading,"42 including assertions of personal knowledge, allusions to unused incriminating evidence, and ridiculing of
defense counsel.43
The prosecutor's tactics in Berger are familiar examples of how a prosecutor
can corrupt the fact-finding process. The following sections amplify Berger's
critique. They offer a typology of conduct by prosecutors that distort, subvert,
suppress, and otherwise impede the search for truth. To the extent that courts
view the central function of a criminal trial as deciding the question of the
defendant's factual
the courts routinely condemn prosecutors for
engaging in conduct that impedes that determination and have reversed
convictions when the prosecutor's conduct sufficiently undermined the accuracy
'6.

practitioners' view that the defense attorney's aim is not truth or fairness, but the most favorable outcome
possible for his or her client.").
39. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
40. The Court condemned the prosecutor's commission of "foul blows" that were "calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction." Id. at 88.
41. Id. at 85. The Court reproduced excerpts from the trial record to illustrate the magnitude of the
prosecutor's misconduct, and criticized the trial judge for failing to issue a "stem rebuke" or take other
"repressive measures." Id.
42. Id. at 85.
43. Justice Sutherland capped his discussion of the prosecutor's misconduct with this oft-quoted passage on
the role of the prosecutor:
[He] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Berger, 295 U.S.at 88.
44. See supra note 27.
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of the guilty verdict.45 On the other hand, courts have tolerated other truthdisserving conduct by prosecutors in order to protect adversarial integrity and
prosecutorial d i ~ c r e t i o nThere
. ~ ~ are also occasions when a prosecutor's duty to
the truth includes an affirmative duty to assist a defendant in discovering the
tr~th.~'
A. DISTORTING THE TRUTH

One way a prosecutor violates the duty to truth is by deliberately distorting the
evidence. Prosecutors do this in several ways: attacking a defendant's character
without a valid evidentiary purpose; misleading the jury and misrepresenting the
facts; and inflaming the passions and prejudices of the jury.

Character proof, as every trial lawyer knows, is one of the most dangerous
types of e ~ i d e n c e . ~The
' capacity of proof of a defendant's criminal past to
skew the jury's proper evaluation of the truth has been d ~ c u m e n t e d By
.~~
insinuating that a defendant's criminal background makes it more likely that
he committed the present crime, the prosecutor encourages the jury to find
the defendant guilty based on speculative, confusing, and inflammatory
considerations.
The danger of this tactic is illustrated in Judge Cardozo's classic opinion in
People v. ~ a c k o w i t zThe
. ~ ~defendant, a young optician regularly employed
with no criminal history, shot a man to death on a Brooklyn street corner who

45. Truth-impeding misconduct does not necessarily invalidate a guilty verdict. After misconduct has been
established, a reviewing court considers the probable impact of the violation on the verdict. The evaluation of
prejudice occurs in one of four principal contexts: (1) harmless error analysis for preserved constitutional
violations, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (conviction reversed unless prosecutor
demonstrates that error harmless beyond reasonable doubt); (2) harmless error analysis for preserved
unconstitutional violations, see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,764-65 (1946) (conviction reversed if
defendant demonstrates that error had "substantial influence" on the verdict or leaves one in "grave doubt"
whether it had such effect); (3) plain error analysis for both constitutional and unconstitutional violations when
the violation was not objected to, see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993) (reversal justified
only if error is "obvious," "affect[s] substantial rights," and "seriously affect[s] the fairness integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings."); and (4) collateral review of preserved constitutional violations, see Brecht
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993) (unconstitutional Korreakos standard applicable to evaluate
constitutional error on habeas corpus review).
46. See infra notes 124-43 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 144-61 and accompanying text.
48. See 1 JOHN HENRYWIGMORE,
EVIDENCE
8 57 (1904) ("The deep tendency of human nature to punish, not
because our victim is guilty this time, but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he is
caught, is a tendency which cannot help'operating with any jury, in or out of court.")
49. See HARRYKALVEN,JR & HANSZEISEL,
THEAMERICAN
JURY 160 (1966) (when a defendant's criminal
record is known and the prosecution's case has weaknesses, the defendant's chances of acquittal are 38%,
compared to 65% otherwise).
50. 172 N.E. 466 (N.Y.1930).
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had insulted his wife. The killing was not disputed. The central question was
the defendant's state of mind. From the evidence, the jury was free to choose
from a range of culpable mental states. Judge Cardozo explained how the
jury's delicate analysis could be (and was) manipulated by prosecutorial
overreaching:
With only the rough and ready tests supplied by their experience of life, the
jurors were to look into the workings of another's mind, and discover its
capacities and disabilities, its urges and inhibitions, in moments of intense
excitement. Delicate enough and subtle is the inquiry, even in the most
favorable conditions, with every warping influence excluded. There must be no
blumng of the issues by evidence illegally admitted and carrying with it in its
admission an appeal to prejudice and passion.51

The conviction was reversed because throughout the trial the prosecutor
repeatedly sought to portray the defendant as a man of dangerous propensities
who, because of those qualities, was more likely to kill with a premeditated
design than a man of irreproachable ~haracter.~'
Prosecutors employ a variety of tactics to unfairly impugn a defendant's
~haracter.'~
They accomplish this directly through proof of prior crirnina~ity,~~
by innuendo during the examination of witnesses about the defendant's crim-

5 1. Id. at 467.
52. The prosecutor elicited proof that the defendant owned several guns and other weapons,
none of which were alleged to have been used in the killing, to suggest that the defendant was a
"desperate type of criminal, a criminal affected with a murderous propensity." Id. at 468. As in
Zuckowirz, courts are especially sensitive to insinuations of bad character as skewing the fact-finding
process, and convictions are often reversed. See, e.g., United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878 (5th
Cir. 1998) (prosecutor offers evidence that defendant associated with persons who were convicted
of similar fraudulent behavior); United States v. Heidebur, 122 F.3d 577 (8th Cir. 1997) (prosecutor
offers evidence of defendant's molestation of stepdaughter); United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658
(8th Cir. 1997) (prior sexual assaults); United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997)
(prior murder); United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir. 1996) (prior similar sexual
crimes); United States v. Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992 (1st Cir. 1996) (prior arson); People v. Terry, 728
N.E.2d 669 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (prosecutor insinuates that defendant was member of gang that
was dealing drugs); Chumbler v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. 1995) (deviant sexual
behavior).
53. This is not to say that evidence of a defendant's criminal past may not be used to prove guilt. Such
evidence is often relevant and admissible as an aid in arriving at the truth. Prosecutors have broad leeway to use
a defendant's criminal background for a proper purpose, such as impeachment, see FED.R. EVID.608(b), 609, or
when relevant to an issue in the case, such as intent, motive, identity, knowledge, opportunity, common scheme
or plan, or absence of mistake. See FED.R. EVID.404(b).
54. Common techniques include seeking to impeach the defendant's testimony by asking about prior
convictions bearing no relationship to credibility, misrepresenting the nature or seriousness of the
convictions, or insinuating that prior guilt is a basis for inferring present guilt. For discussion of the
prosecutor's misuse of prior convictions, see BENNETTL. GERSHMAN,
TRIALERRORAND MISCONDUCT
5 2-5(c), at 164-66 (1997).
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inal past,55 and by proving that the defendant associates with undesirable
persons.56
2. MISLEADING
AND MISREPRESENTING

Misleading conduct distorts the search for truth by confusing the jury's rational
view of the e~idence.'~
The potential for a prosecutor to mislead inheres in
virtually every phase of the trial, from offering evidence, questioning witnesses,
making comments, and presenting argument^.'^ Since the jury is likely to place
great trust in the prosecutor as the embodiment of law enforcement, the
prosecutor's ability to mislead the jury is greatly enhan~ed.'~
Familiar types of misleading conduct include questions that attempt to create
in the jurors' minds damaging and prejudicial innuendos without any basis in
fact,60personal assurances that the witness is telling the truth,6' allusions to the

.

55. Common techniques include eliciting testimony that witnesses identified the defendant from "mug
books" in police files, introducing police reports containing the defendant's criminal identification number,
proving that the defendant used aliases or variations of his surname to insinuate prior involvement with law
enforcement, or eliciting testimony containing the unmistakable inference that the defendant is a prior felon.
See, e.g., Dunnigan v. Keane, 972 F. Supp. 709 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (prosecutor elicits identification testimony
from witness who tells jury that he was defendant's parole officer). For discussion of the prosecutor's indirect
references to the defendant's character, see GERSHMAN,
supra note 5 4 , s 2-5(d), at 166-67.
56. Prosecutors try to insinuate a defendant's guilt by proving that he associates with other persons who are
involved in criminal activity. See United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878 (5th Cir. 1998) (prosecutor elicits that
defendant who was accused of falsifying odometer readings on vehicle titles had previously done title work for
several other car dealers who were subsequently convicted of odometer fraud); People v. Teny, 728 N.E.2d 669
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (prosecutor insinuates that defendant was member of gang that was dealing drugs and that
supra note 54, 2-5(b), at
shooting occurred on block where there was frequent drug dealing). See GERSHMAN,
162-64.
57. A prosecutor has "a special duty not to mislead." See Myerson, 18 F.3d at 162 n.10 (quoting United States
v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1962)).
58. Misleading conduct is so pervasive that it defies neat categorization. Such conduct can range from using
a distorted chart that inaccurately depicts the organization of a drug conipiracy, see United States v. Taylor, 210
F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2000), to "staging" a courtroom identification by coaching witnesses about the seating
arrangements in the courtroom, see United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739 (1st Cir. 1994), to eliciting on
cross-examination that a defense expert had previously testified for the defense in several notorious and highly
publicized murder cases, see State v. Blasus, 445 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. 1989), to making deliberately false
statements to mislead the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Davis v. Zant, 36
F.3d 1538 (I lth Cir. 1994); Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315; Walker, 974 F.2d 293; United States v. Elizondo, 920 F.2d
1308 (7th Cir. 1990). For a discussion of a prosecutor's use of false and misleading evidence and
misrepresentations, see generally GERSHMAN,
supra note 54, 8 2-4, at 143-61.
59. See supra note 26.
60. Prosecutors have insinuated without any supporting proof that the defendant has a criminal record, see
Thompkins v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1992), a sordid background, see United States v. Hughes, 658 F.2d
317 (5th Cir. 1981). and engaged in criminal conduct similar to the crime presently charged. See United States v.
Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992 (1st Cir. 1996). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 54,s 2-4(c)(2), at 147-48.
61. See United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor asks rhetorically whether
government agents would risk careers by getting on witness stand and committing pe jury); United States v.
Dispoz-0-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 1999) (prosecutor insinuates that he has information confirming
that witnesses told the truth); United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor insinuates that
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validation of a witness's credibility by experts,62 attempts to bolster a witness's
credibility by refeiences to a witness's willingness to take a polygraph test,63
proof that accomplices or codefendants were c ~ n v i c t e d ,forcing
~~
defense
witnesses to characterize the testimony of prosecution witnesses as false,65
references to a witness's prior invocation of a privilege to refuse to testify,66and
references to withdrawn guilty pleas.67
Reversible misconduct also can take the form of comments, questions, and
arguments that misleadingly suggest that a defendant's reliance upon his
constitutional rights is evidence of guilt. For example, a prosecutor unconstitutionally misleads the jury when he tries to impeach a defendant who has offered at
trial an innocent explanation for his conduct by insinuating that the defendant's
failure to tell the police the exculpatory account after being given Miranda
warnings following his arrest suggests that his testimony was a fabrication

he was not willing to deal with cooperating witness until he believed her story). See GERSHMAN,
supra note 54,
5 2-8(c)(l), at 190-91.
62. It is improper to elicit expert testimony that endorses the credibility of the complaining witness, See
United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 1999) (improper to elicit from pediatrician an unqualified
opinion that girls were sexually abused), that expresses an opinion on the defendant's guilt, see State v. Leggett,
664 A.2d 271 (Vt. 1995) (opinion that complaining witness was telling the truth), or that the defendant is guilty
of abuse. See Smith v. State, 674 So.2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (opinion that defendant is guilty of abuse).
See GERSHMAN,
supra note 54,s 5-4(i), at 334-36.
63. It is error to elicit testimony that the defendant failed a lie-detector test, see United States v. Brevard, 739
F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1984), a key witness passed the test, see People v. Daniels, 650 N.E.2d 224 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995), a witness was administered the test, see State v. Kilpatrick, 578 P.2d 1147 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978), and a
witness was willing or unwilling to take the test. See United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981). See
supra note 54, 5 2-4(c)(4), at 148-49.
also GERSHMAN,
64. See United States v. Carraway, 108 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 1997); Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992; United States v.
Blandford, 33 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 1993). Courts
typically allow prosecutors to introduce testimony of guilty pleas of co-conspirators who testify for the
government to explain the context for their cooperation. See United States v. Mejia, 82 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir.
1996); United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355 (3d Cir. 1991). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 54,
5 2-4(c)(6), at 150-5 1.
65. See United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221,224 (1st Cir. 1991) ("It is not the place of one witness to draw
conclusions about, or cast aspersions upon another witness's veracity. The 'was-the-witness-lying' question
framed by the prosecutor in this case was of that stripe. It should never have been posed."). The prejudice is
aggravated when a defendant in order to maintain his innocence is forced to characterize the testimony of police
officers as lies. United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Fernandez, 145 F.3d 59,
64 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Richter, 826 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1987). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 54,
5 2-4(c)(7), at 151.
66. Such questions are usually irrelevant, and can distort the jury's evaluation of the witness's credibility by
suggesting that the witness was hiding the truth. See Gmnewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (improper
to ask witness whether he invoked Fifth Amendment privilege before grand jury). See also GERSHMAN,
supra
note 54, 5 2-4(c)(8), at 151.
67. See FED. R. EVID.410; FED. R. CRIM.P. ll(e)(6). It is usually reversible error for a prosecutor to
introduce evidence that a defendant had previously entered and withdrawn a guilty plea in the same case. See
Standen v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1993). It is improper for a prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant
about a previously entered and withdrawn guilty plea. See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927). See
supra note 54, 8 2-4(c)(5), at 150.
also GERSHMAN,
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concocted specially for the
A prosecutor similarly engages in unconstitutionally misleading behavior when he asks a jury to conclude that a defendant is
guilty because he failed to testify.69Prosecutors also try to mislead by asking the
jury to draw inculpatory conclusions from a defendant's assertion of other rights,
such as obtaining an attorney following his arrest,70refusing to allow the police
to conduct a ~ e a r c h ,or
~ ' relying on other rights.72
A prosecutor also distorts the jury's analysis of the facts when he deliberately
encourages the jury to draw false or exaggerated conclusions by misrepresenting

68. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,617 (1976) (fundamentally unfair for prosecutors to use a defendant's
post-arrest silence after receiving Miranda warnings as a basis for impeachment because such silence is
"insolubly ambiguous" and it is therefore misleading for a prosecutor to suggest that it shows a guilty mind).
However, it is not misleading for a prosecutor to impeach a defendant with his post-arrest silence after the
defendant tries to give the jury the impression that he cooperated with the police. Id. at 619 n.11. See, e.g.,
United States v. Reveles, 190 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 1999) (no violation where prosecutor elicited evidence of
defendant's post-arrest silence for purpose of rebutting defendant's claim that he stood ready to cooperate all
along). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 54, 5 2-7(a), at 180-83.
69. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (unconstitutionally misleading for prosecutor to ask jury to
infer guilt based on defendant's decision not to testify on theory that if defendant was innocent and had nothing
to hide he would have testified). Courts closely scrutinize unambiguous references to a defendant's failure to
testify. See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 37 F.3d 753, 757 (1st Cir. 1994) ("They're still running and hiding
today. The time has come for them to stop running and stop hiding."). Prosecutors therefore try to suggest the
point more subtly, by using words such as "uncontradicted," "unexplained," "undenied," and other rhetorical
devices. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1015 (1st Cir. 1997) (prosecutor commits
"egregious" misconduct by "rhetorical flourishes" designed to focus jury's attention on defendant's failure to
testify); United States v. Skandier, 758 F.2d 43, 44 (1st Cir. 1985) (court criticizes U.S. Department of Justice
brochure of instructions to United States Attorneys advising that it is proper to tell jury that "evidence is
'uncontradicted' or ' u ~ e f u t e din
' a nondefense case."). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 5 4 , s 2-7(b), at 183-84.
70. See United States v. McDonald, 620 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428;443
(D.C. Cir. 1974); State v. Palenkas, 933 P.2d 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Collins, 528 N.Y.S.2d 41
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 5 4 , s 2-7(d), at 185-86.
71. See United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Rapanos, 895 F. Supp. 165
(E.D. Mich. 1995), rev'd, 115 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 1997); State v. Palenkas, 933 P.2d 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).
Bur see United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 793 (10th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that the prosecutor properly
introduced proof of the defendant's refusal to consent to a search "not to impute guilty knowledge to
[defendant], but for the proper purpose of establishing dominion and control over the premises where a large
part of the cocaine was found"); United States v. McNatt, 931 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the
prosecutor's comment on the defendant's refusal to consent to a warrantless search of his vehicle was a fair
response to the defendant's claim that contraband was planted by police). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 54,
2-7(d), at 185-86.
72. See State v. Shinn, 704 A.2d 816 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that the prosecutor impermissibly
burdened the defendant's right to testify by insinuating that the defendant testified only because he believed the
government's case was so strong that he had to give the jury a story for otherwise he would have been found
guilty); State v. Cassidy, 672 A.2d 899 (Conn. 1996) (holding that the defendant's right of confrontation was
violated when the prosecution commented that the defendant's presence at trial allowed him to "doctor up" his
testimony after hearing testimony of other witnesses), overruled by State v. Alexander, 755 A.2d 868, 874-75
(Conn. 2000) (holding that prosecutor violated no federal constitutional rights by commenting on defendant's
presence at trial and accompanying opportunity to fabricate or tailor his testimony). But see Portuondo v. Agard,
529 U.S. 61 (2000) (holding that the prosecutor did not violate the federal constitution by arguing to the jury that
the defendant's testimony should be disbelieved because his presence at trial gave him unique opportunity to
tailor his testimony to that of all the other witnesses).
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the evidence,73or by alluding to facts claimed to be known by the prosecutor but
not revealed during the
The potential to mislead is especially enhanced
because the prosecutor's prestige and standing as a law enforcement expert make
his representations presumptively reliable." Thus, prosecutors have alluded to
unproved private conversations with witnesses or the defendant,76 gratuitously
explained why evidence could not be i n t r ~ d u c e d ,suggested
~~
that facts were
already authoritatively determined,78 and referred to unused inculpatory eviden~e.~~

73. See, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (misrepresenting the facts to connect the defendant to the
murder of a young girl by arguing that the defendant's undershorts were stained with blood although the
prosecutor knew they were actually stained with paint); United States v. Cheska, 202 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that the prosecutor falsely represented that government informant had convicted twenty-three other
people); Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the prosecutor struck a "foul blow"
when he misrepresented that the defendant failed to refute the government's version of events when he knew
that the defendant had been officially cleared of charges after he passed a polygraph test). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 54,§,2-4(d)(2), at 154-55.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Maddox, 156 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (describing how the prosecutor told
the jury what uncalled witnesses would have said regarding what happened to crucial evidence); State v. Evans,
593 N.W.2d 336 (N.D. 1999) (explaining that the prosecutor bolstered informer's identification by stating,
without basis in evidence, that the identification was recorded on tape); State v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 1184 (Ariz.
1998) (stating the prosecutor's argument that the expert changed his opinion after being hired by defense and
that another expert fabricated the diagnosis in exchange for money from the defense); Commonwealth v. Kelly,
629 N.E.2d 999 (Mass. 1994) (mentioning the prosecutor's argument that the police officers would not put their
pensions on the line by testifying falsely, although there was no evidence to show what impact the false
testimony would have on their pensions). Prosecutors occasionally make opening arguments that refer to
matters that are not provable or that the prosecutor does not prove. Convictions are reversed when the prejudice
is serious and the prosecutor acted in bad faith. See United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 248-49 (D.C. Cir.
1997)(concluding that the prosecutor's failure to prove an assertion in the opening statement that the defendant
committed another murder was severe misconduct and potentially prejudicial but that there was no evidence of
bad faith); Alexander v. State, 509 S.E.2d 56 (Ga. 1998) (holding that the prosecutor's false promise in the
opening statement to prove a fact without any subsequent attempt to introduce evidence supporting the alleged
fact requires a reversal unless the prosecutor makes an affirmative showing of good faith). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 54, 5 2-4(d), at 152-57.
75. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
76. For private conversations with witnesses, see United States v. Wiley, 534 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Hoskins, 446 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1971). For private conversations with the defendant, see United States
v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585,593 (2d Cir. 1983); People v. Vann, 388 N.Y.S.2d 902 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
77. See United States v. Flores-Chapa, 48 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the prosecutor made an
allusion to evidence that had previously been excluded); People v. Eanes, 350 N.Y.S.2d 718 (N.Y. App. Div.
1973) (stating that the prosecutor explained why a confidential informant could not be found).
78. Prosecutors have been criticized for suggesting that the same evidence produced at trial had previously
been presented to a grand jury that returned an indictment, see United States v. Lewis, 423 F.2d 457 (8th Cir.
1970), that other trial juries had voted favorably on a witness's credibility, see Wiley, 534 F.2d 689, that another
trial jury had voted unfavorably on a witness's credibility, see United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235 (4th Cir.
1993). and that if the evidence was insufficient the judge would have dismissed the charges. See United States v.
Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1990). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 54, 8 2-4(d)(l), at 152-54.
79. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 87 (1935) (explaining that the prosecutor claimed inability to
elicit identification proof because "that is the rules of the game, and I have to play within those rules"); Snipes v.
United States, 230 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1956) (stating that the prosecutor claimed that he could have brought forty
counts instead of one count); People v. Emerson, 455 N.E.2d 41, 45 (Ill. 1983) (explaining that the prosecutor
stated that "we can't tell you everything [defendant] did after his arrest and he knows it. Maybe when this is over

Heinonline

14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 323 20002001

[Vol. 14:309

A prosecutor's appeals to the jury's fears, passions, and prejudices can
seriously distort the fact-finding process and produce an erroneous verdict." A
jury typically is instructed to analyze facts objectively and not to allow emotional
factors to influence its determination. By eliciting inflammatory testimony,
presenting gruesome physical evidence, or engaging in unduly impassioned
oratory, a prosecutor can manipulate the jury's prejudices and distract them from
objectively assessing the proof.8'
Inflammatory tactics defy neat ~ate~orization.'~
Typical instances include
n a m e ~ a l l i n g ;appeals
~~
to law and order;84 insinuations that the defendant

I will tell you what he did when he was arrested."); People v. Webb, 417 N.Y.S.2d 92 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
(stating that the prosecutor asserted that certain witnesses were not called because their testimony would have
been repetitive).
Misstatements of law also can lead the jury to draw false conclusions. See United States v. Alex Janows &
Co., 2 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 1993) (misstating the law of reasonable doubt); Mahomey v. Wallman, 917 F.2d 469
(10th Cir. 1990) (misstating the law of presumption of innocence); United States v. Yancy, 688 F.2d 70, 72 (8th
Cir. 1982) (misstating the rules of evidence); United States v. Hammond, 642 F.2d 248,249-50 (8th Cir. 1981)
(misstating the law of criminal intent); United States v. Trapnell, 638 F.2d 1016, 1026 (7th Cir. 1980)
(misstating the burden of proof); United States v. Beny, 627 F.2d 193, 200 (9th Cir. 1980) (misstating the
attomey-client privilege).
Also misleading are prosecutorial comments on the consequences of the jury's verdict. Such comments lessen
supra, note 5 4 , s 2-4(d)(3),
the jury's sense of responsibility about the seriousness of its verdict. See GERSHMAN,
at 15'5-57. Prosecutors have referred to potential punishment, see Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)
(explaining that the prosecutor told the capital sentencing jury that a life sentence never really means life), the
existence of sanctions other than incarceration, see Fryson v. State, 301 A.2d 21 1 (Md. App. 1973) (explaining
that the prosecution would place the defendant on probation if found guilty), and the availability of corrective
procedures in the event the jury makes a mistake, such as appeals, writs of error, pardons, and executive
clemency. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (quoting the prosecutor's argument to the capital
sentencing jury that any death sentence would be reviewed for correctness by the state supreme court).
Standard 3-5.8(c) ("The prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to
80. See ABA STANDARDS
appeal to the prejudices of the jury.").
supra note 5 4 , s 2-6, at 167-80.
81. See GERSHMAN,
82. See, e.g., United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322 (I lth Cir. 1999) (introducing in narcotics trial six
photographs depicting graphic evidence of spousal abuse); Tenitory of Guam v. Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154
(9th Cir. 1998) (introducing irrelevant testimony of defendant's reading habits to portray him as a deviant
homosexual); United States v. Payne, 2 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 1993) (referring in postal theft prosecution to the
plight of poor children, pregnant women, and diaperless babies; corporate layoffs; and Christmastime); People
v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. 2000) (displaying the actual bloodied and brain-splattered uniform of a murdered
police officer on a headless torso mannequin).
83. See, e.g., Kincade v. Sparkman, 175 F.3d 444, 445 (6th Cir. 1999) (insinuating improperly that the
defendant was a "professional burglar"); United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1999) (referring
improperly to the defendant as a "liar" and "con man"); United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495,1502-03 (8th Cir.
1996) (refening to the defendants as "bad people"). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 54, 8 2-6(b)(l), at 170-71.
84. A prosecutor's appeals to law and order distort the fact-finding process by introducing irrelevant,
irrational, and inflammatory elements that prevent calm and dispassionate appraisal of the evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gainey, I l l F.3d 834,836 (1 1th Cir. 1997) ("Ajury cannot appropriately reason that a particular
defendant is guilty based on media reports of rampant drug use coupled with the fact that the defendant is
accused of a drug crime. The prosecutor's comment in this case draws upon widespread community fears about
drugs, and implies that those fears can or should inform the process of assessing Gainey's guilt. In other words,
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threatened witne~ses;~'
appeals to racial, ethnic, religious, and national prejud i c e ~appeals
; ~ ~ to wealth and class biases;87and appeals to jurors as parents.88
B. SUBVERTING THE TRUTH

In addition to distorting the jury's evaluation of the truth, a prosecutor can
subvert the truth through lying outright, presenting false evidence, and
allowing false evidence to remain ~ n c o r r e c t e d A
. ~ prosecutor's
~
own false
statements are a paradigmatic example of the prosecutor's corruption of the
truth-seeking function of a trial.90 Equally subversive of truth is a prosecu-

.

the reference invites the jury to judge the case upon standards and grounds other than the evidence and law of
the case, and is thus objectionable and improper."); Blue, 724 N.E.2d at 937 (holding that the prosecutor's
exhortation to the jury to send a message to all police that the jury supported them, from the "superintendent to
the newest rookie," was a transparent play on the jury's sympathy and loyalty to law enforcement). See also
GERSHMAN,
supra note 54, 2-6(b)(2), at 171-73.
85. Insinuating that a witness has been murdered, threatened with harm, or bribed, seriously distorts the
fact-finding process by inviting the jury to speculate as to why a witness died, or did not testify, or testified
poorly. It also suggests to the jury that the prosecutor's insinuation is based on confidential information in the
investigative file that was not introduced in evidence. This type of argument violates ethical rules on several
grounds. It "misleads the jury," see ABA STANDARDS
Standard 3-5.8(b), it constitutes an "argument calculated to
inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury," id. 3-5.8(c), and it "diverts the jury" by "injecting issues
broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused." Id. 3-5.8(d). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 5 4 , s 2-6(b)(3),
at 174.
86. Such arguments distort the fact-finding process by appealing to bigotry and base stereotypes. See,
e.g., Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the prosecutor's assertion that all Sikh
persons are irresistibly predisposed to violence when a family member has been attacked); United States v.
Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (concluding that the prosecutor's argument that "we don't
all look alike" was a blatant use of racial stereotyping to counter the defense counsel's argument on
misidentification); Cannon, 88 F.3d at 1503 ("[Bly twice calling the African-American defendants 'bad
people' and by calling attention to the fact that the Defendants were not locals, the prosecutor gave the jury
an improper and convenient hook on which to hang their verdict."); Caner v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d
Cir. 1987) (indicating that the prosecutor in a highly publicized murder case involving Ruben "Hurricane"
Carter argued, without any support in evidence, that killings were racially motivated). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 54, 2-6(b)(4), at 175-76.
87. See, e.g., Sizemore v. Fletcher, 921 F.2d 667 (6th Cir. 1990) (faulting the prosecutor for insinuating that
the defendant could afford to buy justice through the use of expensive exhibits and multiple defense attorneys);
United States v. Stahl, 616 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing the prosecutor's misleading portrayal of the
case involving a businessman charged with bribery as one "about money, tremendous amounts of money" and
"Park Avenue offices"). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 5 4 , s 2-6(b)(7), at 178.
88. The appeal to jurors as parents of young children can seriously distort the fact-finding by suggesting that
if the defendant is acquitted, those children might be his next victims. See GERSHMAN,
supra note 54,
2-6(b)(8), at 178-79.
89. See GERSHMAN,
supra note 5 4 , s 2-4(b), at 144-46.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (falsifying the amount of money that the
defendant would have gained from having her car stolen); United States v. Forlorma, 94 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1996)
(showing that the prosecutor falsely asserted that the suit found in a bag containing heroin fit the defendant);
Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the prosecutor falsely stated that the key
government witness had not confessed to the murder); Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (prosecutor falsely tells jury that
absent witness could have refused to testify); Walker, 974 F.2d 293 (prosecutor falsely claims that no line-up
had taken place).
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tor's deliberate introduction of perjured testimony.g' In Mooney v. ~ o l o h a n , ~ ~
the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor violated due process when the
prosecutor introduced false evidence that a defendant committed a murder.
The Court stated: "[Dleliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured . . . is inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of justicewg3Truth is corrupted, according to the Court,
whether the prosecutor actively solicits the false evidence, or fails to issue a
correction after false evidence has been received.94 Also, truth is corrupted
whether the false evidence relates to a substantive issue or solely to a
witness's credibility.95
Introducing false physical evidence is similarly condemned because it has
the same capacity to subvert the fact-finding process. False physical
evidence has included paint-stained clothing falsely claimed by a prosecutor
to be stained with the victim's blood,96 a chart falsely depicting the
organization of a drug distribution conspiracy,97 guns falsely linked to an
arms smuggling conspiracy,98 documents falsely purporting to be official
records contradicting the defendant's t e ~ t i m o n y ,and
~ ~ other fraudulent
physical items.'OO
A prosecutor also subverts the truth-finding process when he takes irreconcilably inconsistent positions to obtain convictions against several defendants for

91. A prosecutor's use of perjured testimony, although analytically distinct from issues of suppression of
evidence, see infra notes 103-14 and accompanying text, is frequently discussed as a component of the broader
rule of nondisclosure of evidence. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
92. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
93. Id. at 112. See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir.
1995); United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929 (4th Cir. 1994). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 54, 8 2-4(b), at
144-46.
94. See Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 30 (1957) (indicating that the prosecutor failed to correct witness's
false testimony that he was not having affair with the defendant's wife, which allegedly provoked the defendant
to kill his wife). A prosecutor's actual awareness of the false testimony is irrelevant if the prosecutor "should
have known" about the falsity. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (examining the situation
created by the promise of immunity made by a prosecutor in grand jury attributing to the trial prosecutor's
unawareness of the promise).
95. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1959) ("The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of
a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the
possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend.").
96. See Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
97. See United States v. Taylor, 210 F.3d 31 1 (5th Cir. 2000).
98. See United States v. Kessler, 530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976).
99. See United States v. Steele, 91 F.3d 1046, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996) ("reprehensible" for prosecutor to wave
piece of paper while cross-examining witness to falsely suggest that paper was official record contradicting
' witness's story).
100. See McKinnon v. Cam, 103 F.3d 934,936 (10th Cir. 1996) ("egregiously improper" for prosecutor in
rape case to display to jury pair of handcuffs having no connection to case); People v. Canada, 550 N.Y.S.2d 392
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (prosecutor seeks to introduce hammer into evidence even though he knew it had nothing
to do with case).
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the same crime,'" or changes the theory of the prosecution in the middle of the
trial. lo2
C. SUPPRESSING THE TRUTH

Because of early access to crime scenes and other evidence and superior
investigative resource^,'^^ prosecutors have a unique ability to acquire
evidence that may be inconsistent with the prosecutor's theory of the case or
favorable to the defense.lo4 To the extent that a prosecutor has exclusive
knowledge and control of such evidence, the prosecutor can obstruct the
defendant's access to it and thereby impede the discovery of the truth.lo5 For
this reason, courts have condemned the prosecutor's suppression of materially favorable evidence, or obstruction of defense access to potentially
exculpatory evidence. 'O6

101. See Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067 (1995) (finding violation of due process for prosecutor to take
inconsistent positions on defendant's role as killer) (Stevens, I., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Smith v.
Groose, 205 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding a violation of due process for prosecutor to maintain
irreconcilably inconsistent theories to secure convictions against two defendants in prosecutions for same
offenses arising out of same event); Thompson v. Calderon, 109 F.3d 1358 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that a
prosecutor is forbidden to pursue wholly inconsistent theories of a case at separate trials), rev'd on other
grounds, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
102. See People v. Calandra, 565 N.Y.S.2d 467 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (prosecutor's mid-trial change in
theory of the prosecution deprived defendant of due process requirement of fair notice of charges).
103. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
104. The prosecutor's monopoly of information presupposes that police investigators record fully
and accurately the information they acquire, and then reveal that information to the prosecutor. To be
sure, a prosecutor, "has a duty to learn any favorable evidence known to others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police." See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38
(1995). Nevertheless, there is no correlative duty on the pan of the police to impart such information
to the prosecutor. See Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts. Ma'am:" Lying and the Omission of
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 N. ENG. L. REV. 1, 53 (1993) (maintaining that police
operate independently of prosecutors, answer to different constituencies, and may not reveal to
prosecutors exculpatory information). See also Stanley Z . Fisher, The ProsecutorS Ethical Duty to
Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons From England, 6 8 FORDHAML. REV. 1379
(2000) (proposing amendments to ethics codes to require prosecutors to learn of exculpatory evidence known to police and to provide guidance on implementing responsibility). Needless to say, even
the most scrupulous prosecutorial oversight of police record-keeping will fail to uncover police
misconduct in framing innocent suspects. See Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Rampart Case Takes on
Momentum of Its Own, L.A. TIMES,Dec. 31, 1999, at A1 (describing police scandal involving fabrication of
evidence and framing of innocent suspects).
105. A prosecutor's duty to truth is the same whether he subverts truth by introducing false testimony or
other evidence, see supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text, or whether he impedes the discovery of truth by
preventing the defendant's access to favorable evidence. See Barbara A. Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence
Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN.L. REV. 1133, 1151 (1982) ("In terms of
truth-seeking, there is frequently no real difference between the jury's hearing perjury and its failing to hear
significant favorable evidence.").
106. See GERSHMAN,
supra note 23, at $5 5: 1-5:21. The prosecutor's suppression of evidence is among the
principal causes of wrongful convictions. See supra note 14.
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A prosecutor has a constitutional and ethical duty to disclose favorable
evidence to the defense that has the potential to illuminate the truth.Io7 The
constitutional duty was enunciated in Brady v. M ~ r - y l a n d . The
' ~ ~ ethical duty
requires a prosecutor to make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense or
sentence.Io9 The prosecutor's constitutional duty has been interpreted by the
courts more narrowly than its ethical counterpart, and consequently affords
prosecutors greater leeway to suppress evidence without legal accountability.'I0
Under the constitutional rule, a prosecutor is obligated to disclose only evidence
that is materially favorable to the defense, meaning evidence whose suppression
would seriously impede the search for truth."' Moreover, under the constitutional rule, the evidence must be admissible; favorable information that is not
admissible ordinarily is not di~closable."~
Additionally, under the constitutional
rule, a prosecutor can safely avoid disclosure if the evidence is cumulative of
evidence already dis~losed."~in ally, a defendant's knowledge of the undisclosed evidence, or ability with reasonable diligence to acquire such evidence,
usually relieves the prosecutor of his ~bligation."~

107. Nonconstitutional discovery rules also impose on prosecutors disclosure obligations independent of the
duty under Brady. By denying access to potentially truthful evidence through violations of discovery rules, a
supra note 106, at 8 5:22.
prosecutor can similarly interfere with the search for truth. See GERSHMAN,
108. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.").
Standard 3-3.1 1.
109. See MODELRULESRule 3.8(d); MODELCODEEC 7-13(3); ABA STANDARDS
110. Professional discipline of prosecutors for suppression of evidence is so infrequently invoked that it
rarely functions as a credible and meaningful deterrent to misconduct. See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 13,
at 3; Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65
N.C. L. REV.693 (1987).
111. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,682 (1985) (nondisclosed evidence is material "only if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different."). See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,435 (1995) (amplifying Bagley standard,
stating that the question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different
verdict with the evidence but whether "the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case
in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.").
112. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5 (1995) (polygraph evidence showing that key prosecution
witness lied would not have heen admissible and therefore prosecutor not required to disclose information under
Brady). But see Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695,703 (1 lth Cir. 1999) ("inadmissible evidence may be material if
the evidence would have led to admissible evidence."); United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (determining proffers and statements made by accomplice witness while negotiating plea
agreement to fall within Brady rule as long as information "would have led to admissible evidence.").
113. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 257 (2d Cir. 1998) (deeming undisclosed items of
impeachment evidence aimed at government's key witness cumulative and non-material when defendant's
character already effectively attacked).
114. See Johns v. Bowersox, 203 F.3d 538, 545 (8th Cir. 2000) ("no suppression if defendant could have
learned of the information through reasonable diligence . . . [nlor can there be suppression when the defendant
and the State have equal access to the information."). The extent to which information possessed by other
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Because of the prosecutor's control of the evidence,Il5 he has the ability to
thwart a defendant's ability to learn about favorable witnesses, or to locate and
call such witnesses once they are known.lI6 Denying access to potentially
favorable witnesses may violate not only the defendant's general due process
right to a fair trial but the more specific guarantee contained in the Sixth
Amendment's right to compulsory process.'17
A prosecutor can interfere with a defendant's right to present witnesses in
various ways: deporting illegal aliens before a defendant has had the opportunity
to interview them;"' hiding witnesses and frustrating defense attempts to locate
them;'Ig instructing witnesses not to talk to defense counsel;'20 and threatening
defense witnesses with perjury or other substantive crimes if they testify.I2'
Prosecutors who have engaged in such conduct have compounded the obstruction
governmental officials is imputed to the prosecutor is unsettled. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972) (information possessed by one prosecutor in office imputed to all other prosecutors); United States v.
Steinberg, 99 F.3d 1486 (9th Cir. 1996) (information possessed by police officers who investigated case imputed'
to prosecutor); United States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 1995) (information possessed by other
government agencies involved in investigation imputed to prosecutor). Bur see United States v. Moms, 80 F.3d
1151 (7th Cir. 1996) (prosecutor not charged with knowledge of information in possession of government
agencies that are not investigative arms of prosecutor and have not participated in investigation); United States
v. Moore, 949 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1991) (prosecutor not responsible for information possessed by investigative
agencies of other jurisdictions, even though such agencies might be part of joint task force investigating same
criminal activity).
115. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
116. Aside from denying defense access to witnesses, a prosecutor can also deny access to evidence by
failing to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence. Typical examples of unpreserved evidence include erased
videotapes, crime scene evidence, clothing worn by the defendant, blood, sperm, and urine samples, and
destroyed handwritten notes of police interviews with witnesses. See GERSHMAN,
supra note 54, 8 2-2(c), at
131-33.
117. See Alan Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH.L. REV. 71 (1974) (arguing that rule of
Brady v. Maryland is grounded less on general notions of due process fairness than on Sixth Amendment right to
supra note 54, 8 2-3, at 133-43.
compulsory process to obtain exculpatory witnesses). See also GERSHMAN,
118. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873 (1982) (although prosecutor caused
witnesses to be deported before defense counsel had opportunity to interview them, no due process violation
shown unless defendant makes "plausible showing" that testimony of deported witnesses would have been
"favorable," "material," and "not cumulative," or that prosecutor's conduct in removing witnesses from country
was deliberately undertaken to deprive defense of opportunity to interview him).
119. See United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor, in violation of court order,
intentionally misleads court and defense counsel concerning knowledge of witness's whereabouts); People v.
Avery, 377 N.E.2d 1271 (111. App. Ct. 1978) (prosecutor holds witness in custody instead of allowing him to
speak to defense counsel).
120. See ABA STANDARDS
Standard 3-3.l(d) ("A prosecutor should not discourage or obstruct communication between prospective witnesses and defense counsel. A prosecutor should not advise any person or cause
any person to be advised to decline to give to the defense information which such person has the right to give.").
Convictions have been reversed because prosecutors instructed witnesses not to talk to defense counsel. See
Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966); State v. Bum, 550 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1976); State v.
Hammler, 312 So.2d 306 (La. 1975); State v. Han; 194 S.E.2d 652 (W. Va. 1973).
121. See United States v. Golding, 168 F.3d 700 (4th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor threatens to charge witness with
weapons possession if he testified); United States v. Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1998) (prosecutor
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to a witness's potentially truth-enhancing testimony by advising the jury that the
witness's absence indicates the falsity of the defendant's story,Iz2 or by calling
the jury's attention to the defendant's failure to present exculpatory ~ i t n e s s e s . " ~
D. OTHER TRUTH-DISSERVING CONDUCT
Thus far, we have examined a prosecutor's duty to truth in the context of
prosecutorial conduct that deliberately impedes the search for truth without any
countervailing governmental interest except a desire to win the case. There are
other occasions, however, when a prosecutor engages in what appears to be
adversarially correct behavior that nonetheless impedes the search for truth.Iz4 AS
examples, a prosecutor is allowed to some extent to exploit defense counsel's
misconduct and mistakes, and to make legally proper objections to the
defendant's presentation of potentially truth-enhancing evidence. The prosecutor's conduct, although adversarially correct, may seriously impede the search for
truth.'25
1. EXPLOITING
DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S
MISCONDUCT
AND MISTAKES

There is no clear legal or ethical duty on the part of a prosecutor to assist
defense counsel to perform effe~tively.''~
There are occasions when a prosecutor,
in responding to defense counsel's misconduct, or seeking to take advantage of
defense counsel's mistakes, may vindicate the interest in adversarialness at the
expense of truth.

threatens to withhold favorable plea bargain if witness testified); State v. Finley, 998 P.2d 95 (Kan. 2000)
(prosecutor threatens to charge defendant's girlfriend with felony murder if she testified on defendant's behalf).
122. See Golding, 168 F.3d 700 (prosecutor drives witness off stand by threats and then argues that witness's
absence indicates falsity of defendant's story).
123. See Vavages, 151 F.3d 1185 (prosecutor drives alibi witness off stand by threats of perjury charges and
then emphasizes in closing argument defendant's failure to present any witnesses except his small children to
support his alibi defense).
124. The adversary trial is the commonly accepted device for discovering the truth. See supra note 27.
125. A recent television documentary described how some prosecutors refuse to allow new testing
of DNA evidence, even in situations where there exists compelling evidence of the defendant's
innocence and the strong probability that DNA testing could prove his innocence. Although the
prosecutor's conduct is technically correct from an adversarial standpoint, the conduct is subject
to criticism as inconsistent with the prosecutor's role as a minister of justice. See FRONTLINE,
The
Case for Innocence, PBS Productions, Jan. 10, 2000. Congress is considering legislation that would
require courts to order free DNA testing at a defendant's request despite a prosecutor's objection. See supra
note 12.
126. But see FREEDMAN,
supra note 4, at 88-89 (arguing that prosecutor has ethical duty to advise court when
defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, as well as duty not to deliberately take advantage of
incompetent defense lawyering); Zacharias, supra note 4, at 68-74 (suggesting possible prosecutorial options,
including prosecuting less effectively, introducing favorable testimony on the defendant's behalf, and
encouraging defense counsel "to shore up his performance."). A prosecutor for tactical reasons may decide to
assist defense counsel not as an aid in discovering truth but in order to protect his case against a post-conviction
claim by the defendant that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
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Under the "fair reply" or "invited response" doctrines, a prosecutor is allowed
to respond to improper conduct by defense counsel in order to equalize the
positions of both sides and remedy unethical defense behavior.'" Although truth
may be impeded when a prosecutor attempts to "fight fire with fire," courts
typically preserve adversarial fairness by allowing prosecutors considerable
leeway to retaliate.Iz8 But while prosecutors may appropriately neutralize
improper defense conduct, courts usually draw the line when prosecutors attempt
to rely on the misconduct as a springboard to launch affirmative attacks upon the
defendant.Iz9Such attacks often take the form of character attacks, distortions of
the truth, and inflammatory conduct.'30
The extent to which a prosecutor should be allowed to exploit defense
mistakes, as opposed to deliberate defense misconduct, is less clear. Opening the
door to a damaging response is one of the risks of trial litigation. Courts usually
allow prosecutors an opportunity to respond when the defense opens the door to a
sensitive area.13' However, courts also find misconduct when the prosecutor's
response goes too far and seriously endangers fact-finding accuracy. For
example, in Berryman v. ort ton,'^' a robbery prosecution, defense counsel
sought to demonstrate that the police investigation was not thorough by asking
the lead detective on cross-examination why he did not try to locate the defendant

127. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 , 1l (1985); United States v. Tasto, 586 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1978);
Reynolds v. State, 505 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
128. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988) (prosecutor's explicit reference to defendant's
failure to testify not improper since it was a "fair response" to defense counsel's argument that the government
would not let defendant tell his side of the story); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168,182-83 (1986) ("the idea
of 'invited response' is used not to excuse improper comments, but to determine their effect on the trial as a
whole"; although Darden's trial was "not perfect," neither was it "fundamentally unfair"); Young, 470 U.S. at
12, 17, 19 (although not condoning prosecutor's improper response to defense counsel's argument, Court
advises lower courts to examine prosecutor's conduct in context, including defense counsel's "opening salvo,"
the jury's "understanding" of the prosecutor's responsive purpose, and the evidence of guilt).
129. Some courts have interpreted Young's discussion of the invited error doctrine to mean that a prosecctor
may neutralize improper defense arguments but may not rely on them as a springboard to launch affirmative
attacks upon the defendant. See United States v. Morgan, 113 F.3d 85 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Josleyn,
99 F.3d 1182 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698 (3d Cir. 1996).
130. See, e.g. United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 1996) (defense opens door by improperly
impeaching witness with prior consistent statements but prosecutor's response constituted damaging character
attack that went well beyond simply meeting impeachment); United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d p55 (9th Cir.
198 1) (defense counsel opens door to circumstances of defendant's prior acquittal but prosecutor improperly
responds by insinuating that acquittal resulted from corruption); Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109 (D.C.
1979) (prosecutor uses redirect examination to respond to defense counsel's improper insinuation by engaging
in gratuitously inflammatory conduct).
131. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 157 (1958) ("[Bly her direct testimony [defendant] had
opened herself to cross-examination on the matters relevantly raised by that testimony"); United States ex rel.
Walker v. Follette, 311 F. Supp. 490, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("where as a matter of trial strategy a defendant
himself decides to open up a sensitive area - whether because he hopes to draw the sting out of the prosecution's
case or because he mistakenly believes he has nothing to fear - he cannot expect the same measure of'protection
from cross-examination as when the prosecution initiates the inquiry.").
132. 100 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1996).
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earlier. Seizing the opportunity, the prosecutor elicited on redirect examination
that the reason for the detective's inaction was that the defendant was the
principal suspect in a separate homicide-robbery investigation.133 The prosecutor
could have corrected defense counsel's false insinuation that the investigation
was not thorough in a much less inflammatory f a ~ h i 0 n . In
I ~addition,
~
rather than
exploiting defense counsel's imprudent conduct, a responsible prosecutor might
have alerted defense counsel or the court to the problem so that gratuitous
damage to the truth could have been a ~ 0 i d e d . I ~ ~

Prosecutors routinely object to alibi evidence where no advance notice has
been given,'36 evidence of a rape victim's prior sexual history where no
advance notice has been given,137and other evidence that although factually
relevant is legally incompetent.138In contrast to a prosecutor's adversarial
conduct that deliberately and unjustifiably impedes the search for truth, the
prosecutor's conduct in seeking to exclude potentially truth-enhancing
evidence based on a technically correct procedural or substantive ground is

133. Id. The trial court declared a mistrial.
134. The prosecutor could have elicited from the witness the existence of an ongoing investigation, without
going into the precise subject matter.
135. Prosecutors have also been criticized for enforcing procedural default rules to prevent defense counsel
from raising meritorious claims that counsel through neglect failed to preserve. Such failures by defense counsel
are often highlighted in death penalty litigation. The prosecutor's refusal to waive procedural dereliction, while
legally correct, is ethically questionable when there exists a serious and potentially meritorious constitutional
issue relevant to the defendant's guilt or punishment. See Bright, supra note 14, at 1872-77.
136. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (courts may exclude alibi testimony as a sanction for willful
noncompliance with discovery rules). A prosecutor's objection to alibi evidence for defense counsel's willful
noncompliance with discovery rules is more justified than seeking preclusion for defense counsel's innocent
noncompliance, particularly when alternative remedies are adequate to protect the government's interests. See
id. at 413 (preclusion may be abuse of discretion when alternative remedies are "adequate and appropriate").
For cases suggesting that preclusion should not he ordered when defense counsel's discovery violation was not
in bad faith, see Anderson v. Groose, 100 F.3d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d
1002 (1st Cir. 1995); Bowling v. Vose, 3 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 1993). But see United States v. Portella, 167 F.3d 687,
705 n.16 (1st Cir. 1999) (court suggests that preclusion of evidence justified even in absence of willful
misconduct); Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1995) (no abuse of discretion to preclude defense from
calling witnesses for non-willful violation of discovery order); United States v. Johnson, 970 F.2d 907, 911
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (bad faith "an important factor but not a prerequisite to exclusion"). See GERSHMAN,
supra note
54, 6 5-3(d), at 320-22.
137. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991) (permissible to exclude evidence based on defense
counsel's violation of discovery rule); United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561, 569 (8th Cir. 1997) (prosecutor's
objection to defense use of arguably relevant evidence of past sexual conduct upheld for defense counsel's
failure to give timely notice).
138. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (violation of due process where prosecutor objected at
capital sentencing proceeding on. hearsay ground to introduction by defendant of witness's exculpatory
out-of-court statement, despite "substantial reasons existed to assume [the statement's] reliability," and despite
fact that prosecutor considered witness sufficiently reliable to use his testimony to secure death sentence against
co-defendant).
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legally justified. However, to the extent that a prosecutor also occupies the
quasi-judicial role of a minister of justice, his invoking procedural or
evidentiary rules to bar potentially relevant evidence is less clear. The issue
has received scant commentary. Indeed, cases that discuss the prosecutor's
effort to exclude potentially truth-promoting evidence address exclusively the
defendant's constitutional right to present a defense.
Thus, in several decisions of the Supreme Court, the prosecutor's invocation of
procedural or evidentiary rules to prevent the introduction of potentially
exculpatory evidence, although adversarial correct, resulted in a violation of the
defendant's constitutional right to fair
In Chambers v. ~ i s s i s s i ~ ~
fori , ' ~ ~
example, due process was violated when the prosecutor relied on state
evidentiary rules to prevent the defense from introducing compelling proof that
another person was guilty of the murder. In Rock v. ~ r k a n s a s , 'the
~ ~ Sixth
Amendment was violated when the prosecutor relied on a state evidence rule to
prevent the defendant from giving testimony in her own behalf. And in
Washington v. exa as,'^* the Sixth Amendment was violated when the prosecutor
relied on a state evidentiary rule to prevent one co-defendant from testifying for
another defendant.'43
E. ASSISTING THE DEFENSE IN DISCOVERING THE TRUTH

Quite apart from the negative duty to avoid truth-disserving conduct discussed
above, there is the more difficult question of the prosecutor's affirmative duty to
advance the search for truth. Does a prosecutor have an obligation to assist a
defendant in testing the authenticity of the evidence that the prosecutor plans to
use against him? Or, does the prosecutor have an obligation to grant immunity to

139. This is not to suggest that the prosecutor's conduct is ethically improper. The point, simply, is that the
prosecutor's conduct as an advocate disserves the search for truth. This is merely another way of critiquing the
role of the adversary system as an effective device to discover the truth.
140. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
141. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
142. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
143. For a more troubling instance of a prosecutor's invocation of rules of evidence to prevent the
introduction of arguably relevant proof, see United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998), where the
Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of polygraph evidence that the defense sought to admit to demonstrate
the defendant's truthfulness. The prosecutor objected to the admission of the evidence at trial, after he
suggested that the defendant submit to a polygraph test to verify his claim of innocence and made the
arrangements for the administration of the test. And although the defendant passed the test, the prosecutor
argued to the jury that the defendant was a liar. See United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 444 (C.A.A.F.
1996) ("He lies. He is a liar. He lies at every opportunity he gets and he has no credibility. Don't believe
him."). Moreover, as noted by Justice Stevens in dissent, the prosecutor's contention that polygraph
evidence is notoriously unreliable is inconsistent with the government's extensive use of polygraphs to
make vital security determinations. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 324 (1998) ("The military has administered
hundreds of thousands of such tests and routinely uses their results for a wide variety of official
decisions.") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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defense witnesses who have potentially material testimony to offer but refuse to
testify on grounds of self-incrimination?
1. ASSISTING THE DEFENSE
W OBTAINING
EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE

Although a defendant has no right to embark on an investigative fishing
e ~ p e d i t i o n , several
'~~
courts have recognized an obligation on a prosecutor to
allow a defendant to test the authenticity of the prosecution's evidence against
him.145The rationale for this duty has been grounded on the Brady doctrine, on
the theory that depriving a defendant of access to evidence that might establish
his innocence is just as much a suppression as if the exculpatory evidence existed
and was suppressed;'46on fundamental fairness, which forbids a prosecutor from
denying a defendant the means necessary to conduct an effective defense and to
cross-examine witnesses against him;147and on a reciprocal discovery rule,
under which a defendant should be allowed the same opportunity to determine
the probative value of the prosecution's evidence against him as a prosecutor has
in determining its inculpatory character.'48 AS a unanimous Supreme Court said
in Wardius v. Oregon, 14' declaring unconstitutional a state alibi statute that made
no provision for reciprocal discovery for the defendant:
Although the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of
discovery which the parties must be afforded, it does speak to the balance of
forces between the accused and his accuser. . . .We do not suggest that the Due
Process Clause of its own force requires Oregon to adopt [discovery]
provisions. But we do hold that in the absence of a strong showing of state
interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street. The state may not
insist that trials be run as a "search for t r u t h so far as defense witnesses are
concerned, while maintaining "poker game" secrecy for its own witnesses.

In line with these principles, courts have required prosecutors to permit a
defendant access to evidence for inspection and testingI5O (and to allow other
investigative procedures, such as a line-upI5') where the defendant shows that the

144. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976).
145. See Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975); People v. White, 358 N.E.2d 1031 (N.Y. 1976);
Warren v. State, 288 So.2d 826 (Ala. 1973).
146. See Henderson, 514 F.2d 744; State v. Koennecke, 545 P.2d 127 (Or. 1976).
147. See State v. Boettcher, 338 So.2d 1356 (La. 1976); Warren, 288 So.2d 826.
148. See Evans v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1974).
149. 412 U.S. 470,474-75 (1973).
150. See Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (permitting ballistics tests of murder weapon and bullet); White, 358
N.E.2d 1031 (permitting chemical tests of narcotics). Bur see People v. Bell, 253 N.W.2d 726 (Mich. Ct. App.
1977) (no due process right to conduct independent scientific examination of evidence).
151. See United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 1970); Berryman v. United States, 378 A.2d 1317
(D.C. 1977); Boetrcher, 338 So.2d 1356; Evans, 522 P.2d 681. There is no constitutional right to a line-up. See
United States v. Kennedy, 450 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1971); People v. Calinda, 372 N.Y.S.2d 479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1975).
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evidence is material to the outcome of the case and a reasonable likelihood exists
that the results will be favorable. Thus, when the outcome of a narcotics
prosecution depends upon the identification of a prohibited substance whose
nature is subject to differing expert opinions, courts ordinarily permit a
defendant, with appropriate safeguards, to test the substance for weight and
composition.152 Similarly, courts will order a prosecutor to permit an independent
ballistics examination by a defendant's expert when the defendant can show that
items of evidence such as a weapon or bullets are material to the case and that his
own examination is necessary to refute the prosecution's expert.lS3Courts have
also required prosecutors to provide the defense with other investigative
assistance, such as the opportunity to conduct a psychiatric examination of
prosecution witnesses,154or to aid in locating informants who might provide
favorable evidence to the defendant. 15'

Prosecutors have broad authority to grant immunity to witnesses in exchange
for their truthful testimony, and the prosecutor's discretion in using that power is
virtually unfettered. 156The power can be abused, particularly when its use has the
effect of seriously distorting the truth-finding process.15' The prosecutor's
immunity-granting power can undermine the search for truth when the defense
152. See White, 358 N.E.2d 1031; Warren, 288 So.2d 826.
153. See Henderson, 5 14 F.2d 744; Koennecke, 545 P.2d 127.
154. See Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 410 P.2d 838 (Cal. 1966).
155. See United States v. Fischel, 686 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1982); People v. Goliday, 505 P.2d 537 (Cal. 1973).
156. Statutes typically authorize a prosecutor's formal grant of immunity to a witness. See, e.g.. 18 U.S.C.
$5 6002, 6003 (2000); N.Y. CRIM.P. L. 5 50.20. Absent statutory authority, prosecutors have no inherent
authority to grant witnesses immunity from prosecution. See Munn v. McKelvey, 733 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Mo.
1987) ("[Tlhe general rule is that a prosecutor is not empowered, solely by virtue of his office, to confer
immunity upon a witness."). Immunity is the quid pro quo to compel a witness to answer questions. See United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976). For Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's controversial use of
immunity, see Sklansky, supra note 16; David Stout, Starr Drops All Charges Against Two Women, N..Y. TIMES,
May 26, 1999, at A28.
The extent to which prosecutors may offer other benefits to witnesses in exchange for their testimony has
generated considerable attention in the courts and the media. In United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th
Cir. 1998), a panel of the Tenth Circuit found that by entering into such deals, federal prosecutors violated 18
U.S.C. 5 201(c)(2), the federal anti-gratuity statute, by "offer[ing] or promis[ing] anything of value to any
person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such person as a
witness upon a trial." Some courts followed the panel's decision. See, e.g., United States v. Lowery, 15 F.
Supp.2d 1348 (S.D. Ha. 1998) (finding violation of statute and ordering suppression of witness's testimony).
Most courts considering the question strongly disagreed with Singleton. See United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d
359 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414 (6th Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit, upon rehearing en
banc, reversed the panel decision, finding that to apply the statute to the U.S. government acting in its sovereign
capacity would be "patently absurd." See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
banc).
157. See United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1991); Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith,
615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); People v. Chin, 490
N.E.2d 505 (N.Y. 1986). See also United States v. LaCoste, 721 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1983) ("reprehensible
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wishes to call a witness who has potentially important testimony to offer but
refuses to testify on grounds of self-incrimination, but who asserts that he will
testify under a grant of immunity. Although courts typically defer to the
prosecutor's refusal, there may be exceptional situations when a prosecutor has a
duty to grant immunity.
Where a defense witness is available to testify and the proffered testimony is
material, clearly exculpatory, not cumulative, and not available from any other
source, some courts balance the prosecutor's interest in maintaining control of his
immunity-granting power against the defendant's due process interest in a fair
trial and avoiding a wrongful c o n v i ~ t i o n . ' ~ ~
Additionally, a prosecutor's one-sided and discriminatory use of the immunitygranting power may so distort the fact-finding process as to require granting
immunity to defense witnesses. This suggestion of reciprocal immunity might
arise if the prosecutor built his case by securing the testimony of one eyewitness
to a crime by granting him immunity but then declining to confer immunity on
another eyewitness whose testimony would be favorable to a defense.'59
Finally, immunity has been used to remedy a prosecutor's distortion of the
fact-finding process by threatening to bring criminal charges against witnesses if
they testify for the defense. Although it may be difficult to determine whether a
prosecutor is acting permissibly or not when he warns potential defense
witnesses of the consequences of their testimony,160prosecutors may act at their
peril when they issue warnings that serve no valid law enforcement purpose other
than to disable the defense from securing favorable evidence to prove the truth of
the defense.16'

conduct" for prosecutor to refuse to stipulate to conversation with potential defense witness ivho refused to
testify).
158. See United States v. Chitty, 760 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that due process requires granting of
immunity to defense witnesses to safeguard defendant's right to essential exculpatory testimony and right to
compulsory process); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 778-79 (2d Cir. 1980) (balancing prosecutor's
refusal to present claim that witness a potential defendant against defendant's claim that testimony from witness
is clearly material, exculpatory, and not cumulative); Virgin Islands, 615 F.2d 964 (judicial immunity available
when immunity properly sought, witness is available to testify, proffered testimony is both essential and clearly
exculpatory, and no strong governmental interests countervail against an immunity grant). See also GERSHMAN,
supra note 5 4 , s 2-3(c)(2), at 141.
159. See United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978) (prosecutor denies immunity to defense
witness with "deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact-finding process"); Earl v. United States, 361
F.2d 531, 534 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (suggesting that defendant could be deprived of fair trial by prosecutor's
uneven use of immunity-granting power); United States v. DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(prosecutor's denial of immunity to defense witnesses while building case through immunity grants to
government witnesses denied defendant fair trial).
160. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
161. See United States v. Momson, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 1976) (after prosecutor's threats caused
defense witness to withhold testimony, court reversed and directed that upon retrial, a judgment of acquittal
would be ordered unless prosecutor conferred immunity on witness); People v. Shapiro, 409 N.E.2d 897, 905
(N.Y. 1980) (after prosecutor's threats drove defense witnesses from stand, court authorized new trial only if
prosecutor extended immunity to those witnesses).
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A. SOURCE AND NATURE OF DUTY TO PREJUDGE TRUTH

Although not articulated in judicial decisions, a prosecutor's duty to truth
embraces a duty to make an independent evaluation of' the credibility of his
witnesses, the reliability of forensic evidence, and the truth of the defendant's
guilt.162This duty arises from the same sources as discussed earlier:'63 the
prosecutor's role as a minister of justice to protect innocent persons from
wrongful convictions; the constitutional rule that forbids the use of false evidence
and the suppression of materially favorable evidence; the ethical rules that
require a prosecutor to have confidence in the truth of the criminal charge; the
prosecutor's superior knowledge and control of the evidence; and the prosecutor's unique power to influence the fact-finder's determination.
The ethical codes require that a prosecutor have some level of confidence in
the accuracy of his case before going forward with the prosecution.164However,
the codes are deficient regarding the degree of confidence and how it should be
achieved. The codes employ several different but ultimately insufficient formulations to guide the prosecutor. First, a prosecutor should not institute or continue to
prosecute a charge if it is not supported by "probable cause.9,165 Second, a
prosecutor may decline to prosecute if he has a reasonable doubt that the accused
is in fact guilty.'66 Third, a prosecutor should not be compelled by his supervisor
to prosecute a case in which he has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the

162. A prosecutor's duty to evaluate the truth of his case is distinct from a judgment as to whether a j u j is
likely to convict. The Justice Department's Principles of Federal Prosecution appear to suggest that the
probability of conviction outweighs the prosecutor's personal judgment as to the truth of his case. See UNITED
STATESDEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE,UNITEDSTATESATTORNEYS'
MANUAL5 9-27.220(B) (1987) (a prosecutor
ordinarily may initiate or recommend prosecution "if helshe believes that the person's conduct constitutes a
Federal offense and that the admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction,"
and "no prosecution should be initiated against any person uniess the government believes that the person
probably will be found guilty."). See also Sklansky, supra note 16, at 528 (claiming tbat Justice Department
guidelines appear to encourage the mindset of prosecutors that "it is not their job to judge the truth of testimony,
only how it will play in the courtroom.").
163. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
164. See MODELRULESRule 3.8(a) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: refrain from prosecuting a
charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause"); MODELCODEDR 7-103(A) ("A public
prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he or
she knows or it is obvious tbat the charges are not supported by probable cause."); ABA STANDARDS
Standard
3-3.9(a) ("A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of
criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause.").
165. Id.
166. See ABA STANDARDS
Standard 3-3.9(b)(i) ("The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good
cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist
which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in.
exercising his or her discretion are: (i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty").
Neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code provide any guidance as to whether a prosecutor may decline to
prosecute an existing charge, and the standard for exercising that discretion.
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accused.'67 Fourth, a prosecutor should not prosecute a case in the absence of
sufficient admissible evidence to support a c o n v i ~ t i o n . ' ~ ~
The probable cause standard is not very demanding.'69As the commentary to
the ABA Standards explains, probable cause is substantially less than sufficient
admissible evidence to sustain a c o n v i ~ t i o n . It
' ~ allows
~
a prosecutor considerable room for error in bringing a charge. Moreover, the reference in the Standards
to the reasonable doubt test is ambiguous. Standard 3-3.9(b)(i) allows a
prosecutor to decline to prosecute if he entertains a reasonable doubt about the
defendant's guilt, but the Standard does not require such action. The commentary
to the ABA Standards refers to "the obvious reasonable doubt test," but provides
no further guidance on the extent to which this test should influence a
prosecutor's decision to prosecute.
In practice, the standard of confidence apparently varies widely. Some
prosecutors, including many with whom I worked and with whom I have been
acquainted over the years, maintain that they would never prosecute a defendant
unless they were personally convinced of the defendant's guilt.'71 Other
prosecutors contend that even if they are not personally convinced of the
defendant's guilt, they would let the jury decide the issue.17' Several academic
commentators, although lacking empirical data to support their claim, have
167. See ABA STANDARDS
Standard 3-3.9(c)'("Aprosecutor should not be compelled by his or her supervisor
to prosecute a case in which he or she has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused."). Neither the Model
Rules nor the Model Code offer any guidance on this issue.
168. See ABA STANDARDS
Standard 3-3.9(a) ("A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or
permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a
conviction."). Interestingly, the standards of the National District Attorneys Association are more demanding,
stating that a prosecutor is justified in not prosecuting if she has "doubt as to the accused's guilt." See NATIONAL
P R O S E C ~STANDARDS
ON
Standard 42.3(a) (Nat'l Dist. Attys. Assoc'n 2d ed. 1991).
169. See FREEDMAN,
supra note 4, at 85 ("Probable cause, of course, may be based upon hearsay and may be
satisfied by even less than a substantial likelihood of guilt"); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an
Adversary System, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV.669, 680-81 ("An ethical prerequisite of probable cause is essentially
meaningless. Probable cause is little more than heightened suspicion, and it is not even remotely sufficient to
screen out individuals who are factually not guilty.").
170. See ABA STANDARDS
Standard 3-3.9(a) cmt. ("A probable cause standard, which is substantially less
than sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a conviction, is sufficiently minimal that a prosecutor should not
err in deciding whether the quantum of evidence is adequate to institute criminal proceedings."). Of course, the
commentary neglects to add that under this standard a prosecutor must "know" that the charges are not
supra note 4,
supported by probable cause, a subjective test that is virtually impossible to prove. See FREEDMAN,
at 86 ("Thus, for practical purposes, there is no ethical limitation imposed upon the prosecutor's discretion
under the Standards.").
171. Uviller, supra note 3 and accompanying text. Professor Uviller opines that adopting such a position
"represents a notable modification of our system of determining truth and adjudicating guilt." See Uviller, supra
note 3, at 1157. Professor Uviller begs the question. It is my thesis, and that of others, that our "system of
determining truth and adjudicating guilt" in fact assumes the interposition of the prosecutor to lessen the risk of
jury error.
172. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Many prosecutors with whom I have been acquainted over the
years embrace this position. For a prosecutor's candid reiteration of this view after the exoneration of an
innocent man who was wrongfully prosecuted and spent eight years in jail, see Jim Yardley, Man is Cleared In
Murder Case After Eight Years, N.Y. TIMES,Oct. 29, 1998, at B 1 (prosecutor defends handling of case, stating:
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argued that notwithstanding the ethical mandate to serve justice, a prosecutor is
allowed to proceed even though he lacks a personal belief in a defendant's
g ~ i 1 t . Some
l ~ ~ commentators have even argued that if the proof of guilt and
non-guilt is in "equipoise" - meaning, I take it, that the prosecutor harbors a
substantial doubt of the accused's guilt - the prosecutor should nevertheless let a
jury decide the case.'74
Whatever the prevailing view, there are compelling reasons why a prosecutor
should not proceed with a case unless he is personally convinced, beyond a
reasonable doubt, of the factual truth of his case - that his witnesses are truthful
and accurate - and of the legal truth - that the evidence proves the defendant's
guilt of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.'75 First, the prosecutor is
much better qualified than the jury at judging the factual and legal truth of a
case.'76 The prosecutor knows much more about the case than the jury could ever

"We live by an adversarial system. Our job is to present evidence we believe is credible. The defense's job is to
poke holes in it. In a sense, the system worked, although it took some time.").
173. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
174. See Uviller, supra note 3, at 1159 ("[Wlhen the issue stands in equipoise in his own mind, when he is
honestly unable to judge where the truth of the matter lies, I see no flaw in the conduct of the prosecutor who
fairly lays the matter before judge or jury"). However, how does a conscientious prosecutor in such a case
"fairly lay the matter before the jury?" How does the prosecutor cross-examine defense witnesses? Does the
prosecutor vigorously cross-examine the defendant, or his alibi witness, to try to confuse them, or make them
appear unsure or indecisive, even though the prosecutor has some reason to believe they are telling the truth?
Some witnesses can be easily discredited. Where a defendant presents his mother as his alibi witness, a
prosecutor need only ask one question: "Would you lie for your son?' Discrediting a disinterested and
believable alibi witness is another matter. A prosecutor should never allow himself to be placed in a position of
having to impeach a truthful witness to rehabilitate the testimony of an unreliable witness. Further, how does the
prosecutor argue the case to the jury? Does he attempt to persuade the jury that the defendant's guilt has been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt even though he himself is not sure? What, in other words, would constitute a
fair presentation of the case when the prosecutor is personally doubtful of the defendant's guilt? And, in the end,
is manipulating the truth proper behavior for a "minister of justice?'
175. I recognize that in many cases when a prosecutor has a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt, or
there is some other impediment to a successful conviction, a prosecutor will avoid putting the defendant to trial
by agreeing to recommend a guilty plea. The ethical codes do not address this situation. See ABA S T A ~ A R D S
Standard 3-3.9 cmt. (noting "continuing disagreement among prosecutors" on the issue but taking no position).
To be sure, a defendant's willingness to admit guilt may remove the prosecutor's personal doubt. See Uviller,
supra note 3, at 1157. However, the potential for prosecutorial abuse is manifest. See Albert Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U . CHI. L. REV. 50,59 (1968) (refening to a Chicago prosecutor who
stated: "When we have a weak case for any reason, we'll reduce to almost anything rather than lose."). In my
judgment, it is ethically proper for a prosecutor who entertains a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt to
entertain a plea agreement that has been voluntarily offered by defense counsel. It is quite another matter for the
prosecutor to try to persuade an unwilling defendant to accept a reduced plea to a crime that the prosecutor
either doubts the defendant committed, or knows he cannot prosecute because of evidentiary weaknesses. The
latter situation is ethically improper.
Oct. 25,
176. See David Kocieniewski, Attempted Murder Charge Dropped Against Trooper, N.Y. TIMES,
2000, at B6 (prosecutor drops charges after two new witnesses came forward to support defendant's claim of
self defense, notwithstanding criticism from community that jury should have allowed to decide merits of
charge). Bur see Uviller, supra note 3, at 1158 ("Indeed, should the conscientious prosecutor set himself the
arduous task of deciding whether in this instance the complainant is right? If it is his duty to do so, how does he
rationally reach a conclusion? For this purpose, are his mental processes superior to the jurors' or the judge's?').
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know. The prosecutor has more information about the background of witnesses
and the defendant, and the availability of other admissible and non-admissible
evidence. The prosecutor has spent more time studying the evidence than the
jury, has more experience than the jury in judging the credibility of particular
w i t n e ~ s e s , and
' ~ ~ has acquired an expertise in specialized areas of prosecution
that the jury lacks. 17'
A prosecutor's informal adjudication of guilt is more trustworthy than that of a
jury for another reason. Aprosecutor can maintain a neutral and objective view of
the evidence more readily than a jury. Empirical studies suggest that a jury's view
of the evidence can be readily influenced by a variety of prejudicial, nonevidentiary factors. 179 Ironically, a prosecutor who entertains a significant doubt

177. See, e.g.. Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL
S ~ D395,
. 446 (1987) ("There is every reason to believe that prosecutors, with more information at their
disposal and more experience, are considerably better than juries at judging identification in criminal cases.").
Juries often are disproportionately affected by graphic evidence or unduly vulnerable to inadmissible or
prejudicial evidence. See infra note 179. A prosecutor's mindset of neutrality makes him much better suited to
analyze facts objectively and impartially. See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of
. L. REV. 1695 (2000) (arguing that a prosecutor must possess
Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM
an open, neutral frame of mind in order to make a careful and objective evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and the reliability of other evidence). See also infra notes 188-226 and accompanying text (discussing how
prosecutor implements duty to truth). The danger, of course, is that a prosecutor may strongly believe in the
defendant's guilt, or succumb to the pressure to win the case, and consequently not evaluate his case with the
requisite degree of impartiality and objectivity. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 945 (according to a former
federal prosecutor: "Prosecutors are convinced they have the guilty guy, then they go about seeking to convict
and do not carefully look at things that are funny about their case."); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical
Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL.550, 554 (1987) ("Instead of being an agnostic on guilt, the
prosecutor naturally assumes that defendants are guilty.").
178. Most prosecutors would readily acknowledge that they are far more better qualified than jurors to
evaluate the reliability of eyewitnesses, the credibility of cooperating witnesses, the truthfulness of police
witnesses, and the suggestibility of child witnesses. For these observations I naturally rely on my own
experience as a prosecutor, interviews with former prosecutors and defense attorneys, acquaintance with judges
and other personnel in the criminal justice system, as well as familiarity with legal and social science literature
on criminal prosecution. The following sources are useful critiques of prosecutors offices and the day-to-day
work of prosecutors in both urban and rural settings. These sources often, but not always, support my own
hypotheses about a prosecutor's expertise in "sizing up" a case and evaluating the truthfulness and accuracy of
his witnesses. See MARKBAKER,D.A.: ~ROSECUTORSIN THEIR OWNWORDS(1999); JAMESSTEWART,
THE
PROSECUTORS
(1987); JOANE. JACOBY,THEAMERICANPROSECUTOR;
A SEARCH
FOR IDENTITY
(1980); LEIFH.
CARTER,THELIMITSOF ORDER(1974); George T. Fekenes, The Prosecutor: A LookAt Reality, 7 SW. U.L.REV.
98 (1975).
& NANCYPENNINGTON,
INSIDE
THE JURY232 (1983) (inadmissible.
179. See REIDHASTIE,STEVEND. PENROD
evidence and stricken testimony has impact on jurors' decision-making); Judy Platania & Gary Moran, Due
Process and the Death Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument in Capital Trials, 23
LAW& HUM.BEHAV.471 (1999) (juries exposed to improper prosecutorial statements in closing argument
recommended death penalty significantly more often than those not exposed to statements); Thompson,
Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC.PSYCHOL.
453 (1981) (finding jury more
Likely to consider inadmissible evidence favoring defense than prosecution); Thomas A. Pyszczynski &
Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The Effects of Opening Statements on Mock Jurors' Verdicts in Simulated Criminal
301 (1981) (suggesting that jurors unduly affected by prosecutor's strong
Trial, 11 J. APPLIEDSOC. PSYCHOL.
opening presentation of evidence); Bobby J. Calder, Chester A. Insko & Ben Ymdell, The Relation of Cognitive
SOC. PSYCHOL.
62 (1974) (finding
and Memorial Processes to Persuasion in a Simulated Jury Trial, 4 J. APPLIED
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about the truth of his case may impress a jury with the strength of the case merely
by virtue of his decision to prosecute. Juries trust prosecutors; they are impressed
by the prosecutor's prestige and expertise.'80 Indeed, jurors may reasonably
assume that a case would not be brought in the first place if the prosecutor
harbored any doubt, and may even assume that additional evidence probably
exists to support the hypothesis of guilt.'81 Two generalizations reinforce the
danger of letting juries decide a questionable case: juries usually reach a verdict
and that verdict usually is guilty.'82
Moreover, a jury trial under the best circumstances is a last resort; it is an
expensive and infrequently used mechanism to try to resolve a dispute that the
parties are unable to settle vol~ntarily."~To allow a jury to second-guess a
prosecutor's determination that a reasonable doubt exists may be an unreasonably expensive use of judicial resources that could be better expended on more
meritorious prosecutions. Thus, when a prosecutor has made a careful and
objective determination that a reasonable doubt exists, there is nothing left for a
jury trial to accomplish except to reaffirm the prosecutor's determination by
conferring the community's stamp of approval on that judgment, or to secondguess the prosecutor's decision. But as noted above, there is no reason to expect
that a jury will find the truth when a prosecutor remains in doubt.Ig4
Finally, a fundamental value in the U.S. criminal justice system is that it is
preferable to acquit a guilty defendant than to convict an innocent defendant.lS5
Given the extensive documentation of wrongful conviction^,"^ and the concornitant need to minimize that risk, it is most protective of this value if a prosecutor
assumes the role of an informal gatekeeper of the truth to screen doubtful cases
from the jury."'
that the more arguments counsel raises with respect to different substantive arguments offered, the more jury
will believe in that party's case); Stanley Sue, Ronald E. Smith & Cathy Caldwell, The Effects of Inadmissible
SOC.PSYCHOL.
345 (973)
Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors - A Moral Dilemma, 3 J . APPLIED
(finding direct correlation between influence of inadmissible evidence and strength of prosecutor's case so that
inadmissible evidence most prejudicial when prosecutor's case is weak).
180. See supra note 26.
181. In fact, some prosecutors try to make this point explicitly by insinuating that additional, unused
evidence exists to prove the defendant's guilt. Convictions are often reversed for such misconduct. See
GERSHMAN,
S U ~ Mnote 54, 5 2-8, at 186-93.
182. See HARRY KALVEN
& HANSZEISEL,THEAMERICAN
JURY55-63 (1966).
183. As it is, under the draconian regime of the federal sentencing guidelines, the prevalence of federal
criminal trials is becoming increasingly infrequent. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 933 n.69 (estimating that
only three percent of indictments are tried in New York's federal southern district; ninety seven percent are plea
dispositions).
184. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
185. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,372 (1970) ("a fundamental value determination in our society [is] that
it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.") (Harlan, J., concurring).
186. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
187. This is not to suggest that prosecutors currently are remiss in not screening doubtful cases. Prosecutors
typically decline to prosecute substantial numbers of cases. Of the 98,454 criminal suspects charged from Oct.
1, 1995 through Sept. 30, 1996, thirty-three percent declined for the prosecution. See Bureau of Justice
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B. IMPLEMENTING THE DUTY TO PREJUDGE THE TRUTH

To meet his constitutional and ethical obligations, a prosecutor should evaluate
his proof according to the following precepts. First, a prosecutor should approach
the preparation of a case with a healthy skepticism concerning the evidence
collected. Second, a prosecutor should be willing to subject the hypothesis of
guilt to rigorous testing. Third, a prosecutor should have the courage to decline
prosecution if he entertains a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.

A prosecutor should approach the preparation of a case with a healthy
s k e p t i c i ~ m .He
' ~ ~should not assume that his witnesses are telling the truth, the
forensic evidence is accurate, and the defendant is guilty. Only by maintaining
the attitude of a true skeptic can a prosecutor insure the validity of the hypothesis
of guilt and be able to exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence.189 A
prosecutor's preliminary analysis will likely be influenced by the quality of the
investigation. A prosecutor might reasonably assume that more serious cases such
as homicides and drug-trafficking conspiracies will probably command greater
investigative resources and be investigated more thoroughly by the police than
routine burglary or assault cases. And a prosecutor might reasonably place
greater confidence in the accuracy of an investigation that employs specialized
resources, involves close and ongoing supervision, includes investigators with

Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 1996, 16 (1998). The point of
this Article is to explain the ethical basis for the prosecutor's screening function, and how the prosecutor should
exercise that function.
188. See Uviller, supra note 177, at 1703 ("[Tlhe prosecutor should approach the case handed to him with a
working degree of suspicion. The good prosecutor - like any good trial lawyer - is skeptical of what appears
patent to others, and curious concerning details that seem trivial to the causal observer."). The extent to which
prosecutors approach a case with a skeptical mindset is unclear. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 945-47
(several former federal prosecutors stated: "[Some prosecutors] get wedded to their theory and things
inconsistent with their theory are ignored;" "[Aldditional probing makes the case more complicated and
sometimes more difficult to prevail so people ignore such facts;" "[Iln high profile cases, the pressures and
mindset of some prosecutors make it less likely that the government will carefully examine lies by its
cooperators"); Jonakait, supra note 177, at 554 ("Instead of being an agnostic on guilt, the prosecutor naturally
assumes that defendants are guilty.").
. 189. A difficult problem might arise in prosecuting several defendants together who though jointly
involved in the crime, have markedly different degrees of culpability. A prosecutor might reasonably
conclude that one of the defendants has only limited involvement in the case, or the prosecutor might
entertain a reasonable doubt of his guilty involvement. However, the prosecutor might also reasonably
anticipate that this defendant might falsely "take the weight" for the other defendants if his case was
prematurely dismissed. A prosecutor could attempt to "lock in" the person's testimony either by
immunizing him and obtaining his sworn grand jury testimony, or through a plea disposition and an
appropriate plea colloquy that limits his ability to manipulate the process. But see Kaplan, supra note 4, at
179-80 ("[A] far lower degree of belief in guilt (or perhaps even none at all) seemed to be required when
the question was whether the subject under consideration should be joined as a co-defendant with one
whom the prosecutor did believe to he guilty.").
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considerable experience and selective caseloads, and involves significant oversight by prosecutors.1g0
In judging the quality of the proof, a prosecutor is aware of the risk to truth
from the testimony of certain kinds of witnesses, and has a special responsibility
to insure that their testimony is truthful. These notoriously unreliable witnesses
include identification witnesses,lgl young children,Ig2 and cooperating witnesses
such as informants, accomplices, and so-called "snitches."193The vast majority
of wrongful convictions are attributable to the testimony of these witnesses.lg4
The testimony of these witnesses share common risks to the truth; they pose

190. The structure of some prosecutors offices provides an added reason why prosecutors must be
skeptical, and alert to credibility or evidentiary defects. For example, the practice in some prosecutors
offices of horizontal assignments to bureaus instead of vertical assignments to specific cases might impair
communication among prosecutors about defects in a case until the case is being readied for trial. Defects
may not be as easily discovered if different prosecutors are assigned to different functions such as initial
screening, grand jury presentations, plea negotiations, and trial work. And mistakes once made may
become increasingly difficult to correct as the case moves further through the prosecutor's office on its way
to trial. See CARTER,supra note 178, at 129-130 ("degree to which segmentation of work on a case
prevented the discovery of weaknesses" and "discouraged the deputies from learning about the mistakes
they made."). Additionally, the practice in some prosecutors offices of assigning new or inexperienced
prosecutors to screen new cases, or assigning these prosecutors to present cases to a grand jury, risks
creating at an early stage serious legal and factual errors. See Felkenes, supra note 178, at 100, 105
(prosecutors are generally young lawyers who utilize the office of the prosecutor as a training ground for
legal and trial experience).
191. See EDWINM. BORCHARD,CONVICTING
THE INNOCENT
(1932) (documentation of sixty-two
American and three British cases of convictions of innocent defendants); FELIXFRANKFURTER,
THECASEOF
S ~ c c AND
o VANZETTI
30 (1 927) ("The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards
of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and
American trials."); Jennifer L. Davenport, Steven D. Penrod, & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Identification
Evidence, 3 PSYCHOL.PUB. POL'Y & L. 338 (1997) ("both archival studies and psychological research
suggest that eyewitnesses are frequently mistaken in their identifications"); Rattner, supra note 14, at
289-92 (claiming that misidentification is the single largest reason for wrongful convictions); Gross, supra
note 177, at 396 ("eyewitness unreliability is the unmistakable conclusion of a vast quantity of
psychological research").
The recent execution of Gary Graham in Texas came after years of litigation and public controversy over the
accuracy of a highly questionable identification by the only eyewitness. See Jim Yardley, In Death Row Dispute,
A Witness Stands Firm, N.Y. TIMES,June 16,2000, at A22.
192. See Angela R. Dunn, Questioning the Reliability of Children's Testimony: An Examination of the
REV.203,203-09 (1995)(describing "widespread concern about the
Problematic Elements, 19 LAW& PSYCHOL.
reliability of the child's statements" and factors affecting u~eliability);Carey Goldberg, Youths' "Tainted"
Testimony is Barred in Day Care Retrial, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1998, at A6 (discussing several reversals of
convictions in sexual abuse trials and increasing concern over reliability of child witnesses).
193. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 918 ("[Rlisk that cooperators will provide false evidence is a
longstanding, well-documented concern"); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIOST. L.J. 69,
97 11.98 (1995) ("the incentives for the defendant to give 'truthful' testimony may also lead him to give a false
account that he believes - correctly or not - the government would prefer to hear."); Christine J. Saverda,
Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100 YALEL.J. 785, 787 (1990)
("The fact that accomplice testimony is presumptively unreliable has never been disputed."); Evan Haglund,
Impeaching the Underworld Informant, 6 3 S. CAL.L. REV. 1405, 1412-17 (1990) (providing several dramatic
illustrations of informant frame-ups).
194. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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special dangers of falsehood and mistake of which the prosecutor is aware but the
jury is not.'95
Additionally, a prosecutor should take a hard look at prior encounters between
witnesses and the police to ascertain the presence and extent of any improper
influence. Courts have not been especially vigilant over suggestive interviewing
techniques of witnesses, leaving it up to the adversary process to expose
impr~prieties.'~~
Even assuming highly skilled defense counsel able to test the
accuracy and truthfulness of the prosecution's proof - a basic postulate of the
adversary system's effecti~eness'~'
- the process necessarily malfunctions when
the prosecutor is able to control and shape the information that enters the process
and eliminate or polish up information that is detrimental to his case.198Among

195. These risks include inherent weaknesses in eyewitness testimony, see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218,228-29 (1967) (noting degree of improper suggestion contributing to misidentification); Gross, supra note
177, at 432 ("juries are not particularly good at evaluating eyewitness testimony and determining its accuracy
and are not exceptionally careful about convicting defendants on the basis of eyewitness evidence."), inevitable
fabrications from suggestive interviewing techniques with children, see Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 812-13
(1990) (noting "blatantly leading questions," "interrogation was performed by someone with a preconceived
idea of what the child should be disclosing," and failure to preserve interview on videotape); State v. Michaels,
642 A.2d 1372, 1383 (N.J. 1994) (noting coercive and suggestive interviewing techniques, bias of interviewer,
asking leading questions, multiple interviews, incessant questioning, vilification of defendant, ongoing contact
with peers and use of their statements, use of threats, bribes, and cajoling, and failure to videotape or otherwise
document interview sessions), and the capacity of informants, accomplices, and "snitches," to manipulate the
truth. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 921 ("a cooperator can manipulate the details of the events without
arousing much, if any, suspicion and still be believable to a jury"). Various prophylactic procedures have been
established to minimize potential impediments to the truth from these witnesses. Procedures include cautionary
instructions, see Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 103 (1972) (cautionary instruction regarding testimony of
accomplice a "commonsense recognition that an accomplice may have a special interest in testifying, thus
casting doubt upon his veracity."); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952) (encouraging courts to
give juries "careful instructions" to scrutinize informant's motivation for testifying); United States v. Telfaire,
469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (leading case requiring cautionary instructions emphasizing dangers of
eyewitness identifications), corroboration requirements, see N.Y. CRIM.P. L. 5 60.22 (requiring corroboration of
testimony of accomplice); GA. CODEANN.5 24-3-53 (requiring corroboration of confession), and use of expert
witnesses. See United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991) (allowing expert testimony on reliability
of eyewitness identification); Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1
PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y& L. 909 (1995) (arguing that testimony by research psychologists about eyewitness
testimony is necessary to provide jurors education and perspective about eyewitness testimony).
196. For commentary on the practice and ethics of witness preparation and witness coaching, see Richard C.
Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1 (1995); John S. Applegate, Witness
Preparation, 68 TEX.L. REV.277 (1989); John D. Piorkowski, Jr., Professional Conduct and the Preparation of
ETHICS389 (1987).
Witnessesfor Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations of "Coaching. 1 GEO.J. LEGAL
197. But see supra, note 14.
198. For egregious examples of prosecutorial manipulation of a witness's testimony, see Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 442-43 (1995) (eyewitness told police he did not see struggle and shooting, but at trial
"describe[d] with such detailed clarity" the struggle and shooting that it "rais[ed] a substantial implication that,
the prosecutor had coached him to give it."); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (after
cooperator identifies Walker and another person named Givens as participants in a felony murder, prosecutor
learns that Givens was in jail at time of robbery; at trial, cooperator identifies Walker without mentioning
Givens). See also Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U . PA. L. REV.1031, 1042
(1975) (discussing partisan manipulation of evidence). There are additional dangers when a prosecutor brings a
case to trial involving the testimony of witnesses in whom the prosecutor lacks confidence. In order to counter
"
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the common dangers are excessive coaching,'99 failure of the interviewer to take
notes in early interview sessions until the witness "has got the story straight,7,200
and the discredited practice of destroying notes.201
Prosecutors should be especially alert to any motive a witness might have to
falsify. This caution applies not only with respect to cooperating witnesses, such
as informants and accomplices, but also to witnesses who do not appear to have
any interest in the outcome of the case.*02 The practice in some prosecutors'
offices of "polishing up" questionable witnesses does serious damage to the
pursuit of the truth. Some police and prosecutors engage in Pygmallion-like
inevitable and unforeseeable defense attacks on her witness's credibility, even the most conscientious
prosecutor may need to make arguments that impress a jury but disserve the truth. A prosecutor may argue that
an eyewitness's confidence bespeaks accuracy, even though the prosecutor knows that such contention is
misleading. See Steven Penrod, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation,
1 PSYCHOL.
FWB. POL'Y& L. 817,817 (1995) (research study demonstrating how witness confidence "a dubious
indicator of eyewitness accuracy"). A prosecutor may argue that an accomplice is telling the truth because he
signed a cooperation agreement to do so, even though the prosecutor knows that such contention is misleading.
See United States v. Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137, 1150 (2d Cir. 1978) (characterizing prosecutor's use of
cooperation agreement as "prosecutorial overkill," observing that the prosecutor often has no way of knowing
whether the witness is telling the truth or not and that "the promise in the cooperation agreement adds little to
the truth-telling obligation imposed by the oath.") (Friendly, J., concurring). A prosecutor may argue that a child
witness's credibility has been validated by an expert, even though the prosecutor knows that such contention is
improper. See Smith v. State, 674 So.2d 791, 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reversible error for prosecutor to
elicit from expert that child had been abused). And a prosecutor may argue that a confession is reliable because
if the police witness was fabricating he could have lost his pension, even though the prosecutor knows that such
an argument is improper. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 629 N.E.2d 999 (Mass. 1994) (argument that police
officers would not put their pension on line by testifying falsely improper).
199. See Bennett L. Gershman, Coaching Cooperators, CARDOZOL. REV.(2001) (forthcoming) (describing
how prosecutors overtly, covertly, and unintentionally coach false and misleading testimony from cooperating
witnesses); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the
Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U . COLO.L. REV. 75, 110-11 (1992) (describing how some prosecutors "steer"
police testimony by presenting witness with alternative scenarios, advise police witness of what testimony is
needed, and tell police to "toughen up" certain aspects of their testimony); Damaska, supra note 6, at 1094
("During the sessions devoted to 'coaching,' the future witness is likely to adapt himself to expectations
mirrored in the interviewer's one-sided attitude. As a consequence, gaps in his memory may even unconsciously
be filled out by what he thinks accords with the lawyer's expectations and are in tune with his thesis. Later, in
court, these additions to memory images may appear to the witness himself as accurate reproductions of his
original perceptions.").
200. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 961-62 (several former federal prosecutors stated that they rarely
took notes in initial sessions with cooperating witnesses; according to one former prosecutor, "office lore is
don't take too many notes or figure out how to take notes so that they are meaningful to you and no one else. You
do not want a complete set of materials that you have to disclose.").
201. See United States v. Riley, 189 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
202. See ROBERTD. HARE,WITHOUTCONSCIENCE:
THEDISTURBING
WORLDOF THE PSYCHOPATHS
AMONGUS
(1999) (an estimated one percent of the population are pathological liars); Kristin Choo, Perjury With
Conviction: Lawyers Can Use Strategic Tactics At Trial to Expose Pathological Liars on the Witness Stand,
A.B.A. J., June, 1999, at 71 (discussing wrongful prosecution of Jeffrey Blake, convicted of a double murder
on basis of testimony of Dana Garner, a psychopathic liar whose bizarre and uncorroborated testimony should
have been scrutinized more carefully by prosecutors). According to defense counsel, the prosecutor was told by
a family member that Dana Gamer was a pathological liar, but took no action. Telephone interview with
Michelle Fox, Esq., attorney for Jeffrey Blake (Mar. 7,2000).
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attempts to "make over" witnesses who have serious credibility problems, and
then hide information that would expose the deficien~ies.~'~
One of the more
notorious examples is the testimony by jailhouse "snitches". who claim that
defendants spontaneously made full confessions to them under the most
incredible circumstances but are presented at trial to look like public-spirited
citizens doing their duty to truth and justice.204
A skeptical prosecutor endeavoring to fulfill his duty to truth encounters one of
the hardest problems when he suspects that a police officer is lying.205Prosecutor
offices in New York City encountered this problem several years ago in litigating
so-called "dropsy" cases, in which police officers, in order to avoid constitutional
strictures on searches and seizures, testified that defendants dropped, or
abandoned, gambling or narcotics paraphernalia under circumstances that made
such furtive conduct appear incredible. Many prosecutors believed the police
version to be contrived, challenging the officer directly: "Do you expect me to
believe that?'The police, not surprisingly, maintained the truthfulness of their
account, and prosecutors had no way to disprove the claim.206
A dilemma with stakes far higher than the "dropsy" phenomenon confronts a
prosecutor in a murder case that has been "solved by an uncorroborated
confession. Prosecutors are aware that fraudulent confessions are one of the
203. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
NEUFELD
& SCHECK,
supra note 8, at 126-58; Ted Rohrlich & Robert W. Stewart, Jailhouse
204. See DWYER,
Snitches: Trading Lies For Freedom, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1989, at 1.
205. See H. RICHAMUVILLER,
TEMPERED
ZEAL115-16 (1988) ("most police officers" view police perjury as
"natural and inevitable"); David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM.J. CRIM.L.
455, 457 (1999) ("Judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys report that police perjury is commonplace, and
even police officers themselves concede that lying is a regular feature of the life of a cop."); Joe Sexton, New
York Police Often Lie Under Oath, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 22, 1994, at A l (reporting on official inquiry
into police corruption); Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, THENATION,
May 8, 1967,596-97 ("Every lawyer
who practices in the criminal courts knows that police perjury is commonplace."). Commentators have
suggested that prosecutors commonly suspect police of fabrication but do not take any action to correct it. See
Orlield, supra note 199, at 109-10 (suggesting that "prosecutors frequently either tolerate or, more rarely,
encourage police perjury at all steps in the process;" one-half of the prosecutors interviewed believe that
prosecutors "knew, or had reason to know, more than 50% of the time when police fabricated evidence in case
reports"). Commentators differ about the willingness of prosecutors to criticize police conduct. See JEROME
H.
SKOLNICK,
Jusnc~
WITHOUT
TRIAL:LAWENFORCEMENT
IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY
193-197 (3d ed. 1994) (noting
that some prosecutors are "not at all reluctant to criticize police actions" and "it is indeed the policy of the office
to educate police."); JACOBY,
supra note 178, at 110 ("the prosecutor often distrusts and questions the actions
and motives of the police."). But see CARTER,
supra note 178, at 84 ("[Elmpathy, uncertainty, the necessity of
maintaining trust, and the fear of criticism encouraged some prosecutors to become advocates for the police and
discouraged most prosecutors from screening out aggressively the errors they perceived in police practices.").
206. Some prosecutors actually dismissed cases when the scenario was too farfetched, and one office sought
unsuccessfully a judicial remedy in the appellate courts. See People v. Benios, 270 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1971)
(unsuccessful attempt by New York County District Attorney to seek procedural remedy in New York Court of
Appeals that would shift the burden of proof to the prosecutor when police testify that drugs were voluntarily
abandoned). See also Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY
693, 698 (1996) (given "widespread willingness among police to lie on the stand," author
proposes that police be required to submit to polygraph examination when outcome of suppression hearing
depends on credibility).
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principal causes of wrongful convictions.207Not all cases of fraudulent confessions are readily capable of exposure.208A prosecutor faces a serious dilemma
when based on experience and instinct he strongly suspects that a confession is
false but cannot prove it and there is no corroborative evidence. What is the
prosecutor to do in such a case? Should the prosecutor remain neutral, and trust
the adversary process to expose the truth?
There is no easy answer to this question. It may be the hardest question facing a
prosecutor who seeks the
A prosecutor in such case should be suspicious,
and should rigorously test the hypothesis of
The presence or absence of
corroborating evidence is obviously critical to a determination of the truth.'"
And if after such investigation a prosecutor still harbors a reasonable doubt, he
must decline to prosecute.

207. See Mark Hansen, Untrue Confessions, A.B.A. J . , July, 1999, at 50 (quoting Michael McCann,
Milwaukee's district attorney: "[Alny experienced prosecutor knows that [false confession] can, and sometimes
does, happen"). See also STATEOF NEWYORK,COMMISSION
OF INVESTIGATION,
An Investigation of the Suffolk
County District Attorney k Ofice and Police Department 55 (1989) ("astonishingly high" number of homicide
prosecutions involving confessions (94 percent) "provokes skepticism regarding Suffolk County's use of
confessions"); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY
429, 455 (1998) (research depicting "numerous examples of highly probable false confessions"); Welsh S.
White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 105, 111 (1997) (finding that "standard interrogation methods are likely to produce false
confessions in a small but significant number of cases [and] these cases are particularly likely to lead to
miscarriages of justice."). One of my earliest recollections as a prosecutor was learning that my bureau chief
was instrumental in exonerating a defendant charged with murdering two young women by proving that the
police instigated him to falsely confess, and then suggested the details of his confession. The prosecutor was
able to demonstrate that several critical details in the confession were factually implausible, and that other
assertions of the defendant were to inaccurate facts of which the police who obtained the confession were aware.
See Jack Roth, Hogan Clears Whirmore In Two East Side Murders, N.Y. W,Jan. 28,1965, at 1. The Supreme
Court cited the case in a footnote in the Miranda decision to support its assertion that interrogation practices
produce false confessions. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,455 n.24 (1966).
208. Requiring that police interrogations be recorded on tape, as required by Alaska and Minnesota, might
curb the incidence of false confessions. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587,589 (Minn. 1994) ("In the exercise
of our supervisory powers we mandate a recording requirement for all custodial interrogations."); Stephan v.
State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985) ("Today, we hold that an unexcused failure to electronically record a
custodial interrogation conducted in a place of detention violates a suspect's right to due process, under the
Alaska Constitution, and that any statement thus obtained is generally inadmissible.").
209. For federal prosecutors, the credibility of so-called "cooperators" may be more problematic than the
credibility of federal law enforcement agents. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 959 (quoting a former federal
prosecutor as stating that "embellished testimony" by cooperating witnesses "is the dirty little secret of our
system").
210. See infra notes 212-21 and accompanying text.
211. Corroborative proof is obviously crucial to resolving defects or contradictions in the evidence. See
Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 932 ("Virtually all former AUSAs emphasized corroboration as the key factor in
assuring cooperator truthfulness."). Several state jurisdictions require corroboration of an accompliCe's
testimony for a legally sufficient case. See e.g., N.Y. C m . P. L. 5 60.22; CAL. PENALCODE5 1111. Federal law
does not require corroboration. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1917). Rules requiring
corroboration of the testimony of complainants in sexual abuse cases have been abolished. See Anderson, supra
note 14, at 2122.
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In addition to being skeptical of the facts, a prosecutor should be willing to
assume an active role in confirming the truth of the evidence of guilt and
investigating contradictory evidence of inn~cence.'~' As in the robbery case
discussed earlier, only by such active involvement can a prosecutor confirm the
truth, reconcile contradictions, and expose serious deficiencies that suggest that
the defendant may be innocent.'I3 A prosecutor preparing a case hinging on
eyewitness identification should be conversant not only with legal authority but
with social and psycliological literature on memory and the accuracy of
eyewitness identification.'14 Being knowledgeable and resourceful are indispens-

212. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 940 (noting that former federal prosecutors reported "numerous
instances where facts were not uncovered due to lack of investigation."). For recent instances of prosecutors
failing to be alert to defects in the investigation, see Sack & Firestone, supra note 6, at A20 (describing
"disintegration" of prosecutor's murder case against football star Ray Lewis mostly for failing to conduct
adequate investigation into credibility of witnesses); Jim Yardley, Man Is Cleared in Murder Case After Eight
Years, N.Y. ~ E SOct.
, 29,1998, at B 1 (describing prosecutor's failure to carefully investigate credibility of key
witness). The extent to which prosecutors should be charged with a duty to uncover police fabrication of
evidence depends on the relationship between a prosecutors office and the police department. See James
Sterngold, Police Corruption Inquiry ~ x ~ a n in
d Los
s Angeles, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 11,2000, at A16 (reporting that
one hundred cases may have been tainted by planted evidence, false testimony, and other police abuses);
Former State Trooper Explains Why He Fabricated Evidence, N.Y. TIMES,Apr. 16, 1993, at B5 (describing
scandal in upstate New York in which state troopers repeatedly falsified fingerprint evidence). The often close
relationship between prosecutors and police make detection of police fabrication unlikely. See supra notes
199-205 and accompanying text. To be sure, contaminated crime scenes, lost or destroyed evidence,
questionable identification procedures, and suggestive interviewing techniques impede the assembling of a
factually accurate and complete case. The robbery case with which this article began was impaired from the start
by questionable identification procedures, police prejudgment of the defendant's guilt, and a serious
discrepancy between the complainant's description and the defendant's appearance.
213. Some prosecutors are unwilling to aggressively investigate their cases to confirm the truth. See
Yaroshefsky, supra, note 16, at 945 (recounting that former federal prosecutors stated: "Prosecutors are
convinced they have the guilty guy, then they go about seeking to convict and do not carefully look at things that
are funny about their case;" "They get wedded to their theory and things inconsistent with their theory are
ignored."); Jonakait, supra note 177, at 559 ("The natural inclination is not to see inconsistent or contradictory
evidence for what it is, but to categorize it as irrelevant or a petty incongruity."); Louis M. Seidman, The Trial
and Execution of Bruno RichardHauptmann: Still Another Case That "WillNot Die, " 66 GEO.L. J. 1,12 (1977)
(prosecutor's "unwarranted confidence. . . was maintained by the simple expedient of ignoring or, if necessary,
distorting evidence that did not conform to the thesis being propounded."). In the prosecution of Jeffrey Blake,
the prosecutor failed to interview an eyewitness who could have corroborated the informant's account.
Telephone interview with Michelle Fox, Esq., attorney for Jeffrey Blake (Mar. 7.2000).
214. There is an increasing body of scientific literature on human memory, with specific application to recall
of information by crime victims and witnesses. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 953 n.174 (listing various
research studies describing how people actually construct memories from experience and phenomena that
influence recall). As with any able trial lawyer, a prosecutor should be conversant with information that affects
the credibility of her witnesses. Many prosecutors are unwilling to confront such issues, either because they of a
mindset that "truth is elusive," or a simplistic, "linear attitude about the truth." See Yarosbefsky, supra note 16,
at 953. Prosecutors generally know much more than juries about the dangers of eyewitness identification, and
this expertise enables prosecutors to make an informed judgment on the reliability of their proof. See Gross,
supra note 177, at 424, 438-40 (describing several instances in which prosecutors took the initiative to
exonerate defendants who had been mistakenly identified by eyewitnesses).
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able qualities in prosecuting difficult cases such as those involving sexual assault,
child abuse, and domestic violence.
Studies suggest that many prosecutors use polygraph examinations effectively
to clear innocent suspects or as a basis for further investigative a~tion.''~
Prosecutors occasionally administer lie detector tests to defendants and witn e ~ s e sUsing
. ~ ~ ~polygraph tests to attempt to exonerate a defendant is effective
only if a prosecutor is institutionally capable of undertaking the corrective action
of dismissing the case in the event the witness fails the test.'"
A prosecutor should always be concerned with representations by defense
counsel that a client is innocent. These claims are made sparingly so as not to
Testing the proof with a hard "second-look" is
impair an attorney's
not only conducive to establishing the truth, but also is in the prosecutor's
self-interest as an advocate. Closely questioning his witnesses - even subjecting
them to the kind of vigorous cross-examination they might be subjected to by
skilled defense counsel at trial - also serves the dual interests of assuring that the
prosecution accords with the truth and preparing the witness for a potentially
difficult courtroom interrogation.
Contradictory or inconsistent evidence must be carefully tested. First, by
failing to consider inconsistent evidence, the prosecutor forms an unwarranted
confidence in the defendant's guilt that might prevent him from taking further
steps to ascertain whether continued prosecution is justified.219Indeed, one of the
major factors in unraveling errors in cases of mistaken identification has been the
willingness of prosecutors to notice evidence that another person may in fact be
the pe~petrator.'~~
Second, a prosecutor who minimizes the significance of
contradictory evidence will probably not be alert to his Brady obligation to

215. See,CARTER, supra note 178, at 123 (describing policy in one prosecutors office of "willingness to
dismiss a case when polygraph examination indicated the suspect's innocence," and agreement between
prosecutors and defense counsel "that if suspect failed the test he would plead guilty rather than take the case to
trial."); Gross, supra note 177, at 422,438-39 (discussing relative importance of polygraph evidence either in
clearing suspects or encouraging further investigation).
216. See id. at 422 (noting reasonable accuracy of polygraph testing, but also that at least seven defendants
were prosecuted and convicted despite fact that they passed pretrial polygraph tests). Prosecutors also employ
the threat of taking a polygraph test as a means of testing a witness's sincerity. A prosecutor can employ the test
without being constitutionally required to disclose to the defense the results. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516
U.S. 1, (1995) (polygraph results showing that key prosecution witness lied not admissible at trial and therefore
not Brady evidence requiring disclosure).
217. See infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
218. See CARTER,
supra note 178, at 85 ("[Tlhe prosecutor adjusts to cues from the defense attorney, the
most important of which is the defense attorney's trustworthiness."). In a recent federal prosecution of a
wrongfully accused defendant, a highly experienced defense attorney refrained from making such representation to the prosecutor, apparently based on his belief that prosecutors hear such claims so often that it falls on
deaf ears. Telephone interview with Philip Weinstein, Esq. (Nov. 20,2000). See Benjamin Weiser, Right Name,
Wrong Man on Trial, Prosecutors Admit, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22,2000, at B3.
219. ~ e Yaroshefsky,
k
supra note 16; Jonakait, supra note 213.
220. See Gross, supra note 177, at 424 n. 93,438-39.
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disclose this evidence to the defense.22' Both of these consequences impair the
integrity of the truth-finding function of the trial and increase the chances that an
innocent defendant may be convicted.

This leads to the final quality of a prosecutor intent on serving truth: moral
courage.222Such courage is possible only in an office that encourages prosecutors to be ministers of justice. Prosecutors' offices that instill such an ethos
encourage prosecutors to discuss openly and critically with supervisors and
colleagues the kinds of issues discussed in this Article. Prosecutors should be
encouraged to evaluate a case critically with colleagues and supervisors to decide
whether a prosecution should be undertaken in view of questionable proof and
the availability of alternative prosecutorial options.
A prosecutor's moral courage to judge the truthfulness of a witness may be
influenced by institutional considerations that discourage either critical evaluation or the ability to take appropriate action. Prosecutors' offices that are heavily
influenced by conviction statistics -both to project a tough law-and-order image
and for leverage in budget negotiations - will probably maintain close
supervision over individual decision making by assistants, and principled
decisions that might be perceived as inconsistent with a strong crime-fighting
image may be discouraged.223It is much more likely in such a setting that a
possibly innocent defendant will be required to accept a generous plea offer on
the eve of trial rather than that the prosecutor will dismiss a case in which he
lacks confidence.224

221. See supra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
222. Just as the annals of criminal law are replete with instances of prosecutorial abuses resulting in
miscarriages of justice, so are they filled with examples of heroic prosecutors actively bent on correcting
injustices. For commentary on moral judgment as affecting discretion, see Anthony v. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race,
48 DUKEL. J. 1157,1242-45 (1999) (discussing prosecutorial invocation of "moral norms" to guide discretion);
Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO.J . LEGALETHICS19,
57-60 (1997) (advocating exercise of moral judgment on "ad hoc basis").
223. See CARTER,
supra note 178, at 107 (county's control of prosecutor's budget allocation "made it wise
[for prosecutor] to conform" to county's criticism of unresolved cases of welfare fraud); Felkenes, supra note
178, at 116 ("[Prosecutor's] future in politics depends very much on his justification for the public expenditures
used to support his office. The office of the district attorney is under a self-imposed pressure to justify its
budget."). There is anecdotal evidence that some prosecutors offices stifle principled decision-making. See
Felkenes, supra note 178, at 117 (according to one young prosecutor, "his freedom to do what he believes to be
right is restricted by the position he holds as prosecutor"); Alschuler, supra note 175, at 64 11.42 (discussing
instance of assistant who would not prosecute a case unless he was personally satisfied of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Denigrated by colleagues as the "best defense lawyer in the office," he left the office
after his first year).
224. See supra note 175. By contrast, prosecutors who need not be as responsive to community pressures are
better situated to make politically unpopular but prosecutorially correct choices. These prosecutors are less
concerned about acquittals or dismissals than elected prosecutors. Although federal prosecutors offices are
usually insulated from political or community pressures, the issue of whether to bring a federal civil rights
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Even good prosecutors who strive to do the right thing may discover that their
quest to do justice suddenly conflicts with the rigorous demands of the adversary
system. The temptation for a prosecutor to believe that his job is to win is always
present for people trained in the adversarial ethic.225Nevertheless, prosecutors
should resist the temptation. The remarks of Attorney General and later Supreme
Court Justice Robert H. Jackson should be the enduring ideal:
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to define as
those which mark a gentleman. And those who need to be told would not
understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship is perhaps
the best protectipn against the abuse of power, and the citizen's safety lies in the
prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not
victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches his
task with
C. PROMOTING A CULTURE OF TRUTH

A prosecutorial culture embodying the qualities described by Justice
Jackson would undoubtedly encourage prosecutors to judge truth aggressively. By contrast, a prosecutorial culture that advocates winning and
maintains won-loss statistics not only discourages a critical examination of
truth but encourages misconduct as
Commentators are able to offer
only tentative conclusions as to how particular prosecutors and prosecutors'
~ . ~ ~conclusions
~
are based on personal
offices approach d e c i s i ~ n - m a k i nSuch
prosecution following an acquittal in state court is an unusual instance of a federal prosecutor responding to
strong community pressures to prosecute a case in federal court that would ordinarily remain in the state court.
See Amy Waldman, Diallo Family Meets With Justice Oficials to Press for Federal Prosecution of Oficers,
N.Y. TIMES,Mar. 3, 2000, at B4. The extent to which a prosecutor is obliged to consider the victim's interests
may influence how critically he analyzes the case and his willingness to proceed in a doubtful case. Federal
prosecutors ordinarily have no individual complainants to whom they must justify their conduct, and who might
arguably attempt to limit the fair but unpopular exercise of discretion. Moreover, the availability of capital
punishment can be highly distortive of the truth to the extent that political or institutional considerations
override an impartial and objective judgment of the truth. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Thin Blue Line: Art o r
Trial in the Fact-Finding Process?, 9 PACEL. REV.275 (1989) (describing how desire to solve police officer's
murder overrode careful analysis of the proof).
225. See Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial:" When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9
GEO. J . LEGALETHICS537, 541 (1996) (unprofessional for prosecutors to "keep tallies and reveal them in
various contexts: political campaigns, interviews with journalists, resumes, cocktail parties and other
opportunities for self-promotion"); Fekenes, supra note 178, at 109 (prosecutor's "working environment
caus[es] him to view his job in terms of convictions rather than the broader achievement of justice").
3 . 6 (1940).
226. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY
227. See Bresler, supra note 225, at 543 ("A prosecutor protective of a 'win-loss' record has an incentive to
cut constitutional and ethical comers to secure a guilty verdict in a weak case - to win at all costs"); Bennett L.
Gershman, Why Prosecutors Misbehave, 22 CRIM.L. BULL.131, 133 (1986) (prosecutorial misconduct occurs
s o often because "it works").
228. Prosecutors are reticent about discussing certain aspects of their work. See BAKER,
supra note 178,
at 14 (prosecutors interviewed "made a point of keeping the content positive and 'safe;' " "Their political
instincts dictate a canny caution when speaking to anyone even vaguely identified as a working member of
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experiences, available studies of prosecutors' offices, interviews of exprosecutors, anecdotal information, and professional and popular literature.
Many prosecutors apparently do not view their role as including a duty to
the
These prosecutors are influenced to some degree by political pressures from the community and the victim, and approach a case
with a mostly uncritical, deferential view of the evidence. These prosecutors
focus almost exclusively on winning the case either through a guilty plea or a
guilty verdict.230 Because of political or institutional constraints, these
prosecutors may be fearful of offending police, victims, or superiors by
appearing to be too defense-minded.231This type of mindset, however, is
incompatible with loyalty to the truth. The following statement by a local
prosecutor following the dismissal of a controversial murder case in which an
innocent defendant spent eight years in jail is not atypical: "We live by an
adversarial system. Our job is to present evidence we believe is credible. The
defense's job is to poke holes in it. In a sense, the system worked, although it
took some time. 9,232

the media."). Consider the recurring and vexing problem of the prosecutor's violation of his duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence. It would be useful for systemic and remedial purposes to learn why so many
prosecutors choose not to disclose evidence of which they are aware and which is favorable to the accused.
See STEWART,
supra note 178, at 207-08 (account of dilemma faced by prosecutor in "CBS Murders" case
in deciding whether to disclose arguably exculpatory statement). There may be a myriad of explanations
for the prosecutor's nondisclosure, some innocent and some venal. Do prosecutors recognize that the
evidence constitutes Brady material? Do they rationalize nondisclosure by resorting to doctrinal
exceptions? Or are they simply acting in bad faith? Violations cannot be for lack of training or supervision
since the Brady rule is as embedded in the prosecutorial culture as any rule of criminal procedure. The most
an observer can d o is speculate on the reasons. It would seem that empirical studies might be able to
illuminate this critical area of prosecutorial discretion. Unless a prosecutor faces tough questions from a
critical judge at trial or during an appellate argument, or from a lawyer in the context of civil litigation, see
Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992), an observer is hard-pressed to penetrate the
prosecutor's mind to learn the reason for the dereliction.
229. These prosecutors, by implication, would argue that even if they have a duty to the truth, that duty has
been satisfied by virtue of their confidence in the defendant's guilt. See CARTER,supra note 178, at 154
(prosecutors maintain that they "almost never 'get the wrong man."'); Felkenes, supra note 178, at 112 ("Many
[prosecutors] believe that once an accused reaches the trial stage, his guilt has been determined by the screening
process of the police and prosecutor, which they believe effectively eliminates the innocent, thereby allowing
only the guilty to proceed through the system."). Bur see Gershman, supra note 224, at 275 (according to
defense attorney Melvyn Bruder: "Prosecutors in Dallas have said for years, 'Any prosecutor can convict a
guilty man; it takes a great prosecutor to convict an innocent man."').
230. See BAKER,supra note 178, at 46 (prosecutor describes "constant pressure to win cases, to keep the
office statistics of 'guilty as charged'climbing from one political season to the next."); CARTER,supra note 178,
at 128 (most deputy prosecutors felt their supervisor "particularly concerned himself with developing good
office statistics"); Felkenes, supra note 178, at 109, 112 (one-third of prosecutors interviewed believed "their
major function is to secure convictions;" many believed that "once an accused reaches the trial stage, his guilt
has been determined by the screening processes of the police and prosecutor.").
231. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
232. See Yardley, supra note 172, at B1 (statement of Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted Jeffrey
Blake for a double murder, despite obvious deficiencies in the credibility of the key prosecution witness).
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Because of politics, institutional pressures, adversarialness, self-righteousness,
and arrogance, these prosecutors may sincerely believe that defendants probably
are guilty, will tend to overlook or ignore exculpatory hypotheses, and will place
winning a case above any other litigation value.233This "conviction mentality" is
especially dangerous in a prosecutors' office that fails to train and supervise
young prosecutors on basic norms of prosecution, such as the duties not to lie, use
false and misleading evidence, and prosecute persons who are not clearly
other prosecutors' offices, by contrast, view their role as embracing a
duty to the
These prosecutors are less responsive to community
pressures or the influence of crime victims are consistently skeptical about the
evidence and resourceful enough to test and retest the validity of the
hypothesis of guilt and have the moral courage to refuse to prosecute a case in
which they lack personal confidence of the defendant's guilt. These prosecutors are animated by a credo that to be a good prosecutor "requires
commitment to absolute integrity and fair play; to candor and fairness in
dealing with adversaries and the courts; to careful preparation, not making
any assumption or leaving anything to chance; and to never proceeding in any
case until convinced of the guilt of the accused or the correctness of one's
position. ,9236

As I have tried to show, a prosecutor has an affirmative duty to pursue the
truth even when assuming the advocate's role. Most of the time, and rightly

233. Contributing to an adversarial mentality may be the practice in large state and local prosecutors
offices of hiring assistants directly out of law school. These young men and women, who lack prior
professional experience, are suddenly endowed with awesome power, and have virtually unfettered
discretion to exercise their power soundly or irresponsibly. See United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1324
(9th Cir. 1993) (referring to a federal prosecutor's serious misconduct, court notes "great danger in
'untrained lawyers wielding public power,"' quoting Stephen Gillers, Under Color of l a w , ABA J., Dec.
1992, at 121).
234. See Kojayan, 8 F.3d at 1324 ("What we find most troubling about this case is not the AUSA's initial
transgression, but that he seemed to be totally unaware he'd done anything at all wrong, and that there was no
one in the United States Attorney's office to set him straight.").
235. Because prosecutors offices are so very different, there has been relatively little discussion over the
extent to which a "prosecutorial culture" can be identified, and whether there exists a "federal prosecutorial
culture" that is different from a "state or local prosecutorial culture." But see Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A.
Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 CEO. L.J. 207, 238 (2000) ("it may be that federal
prosecutors, and the offices in which they work, take the duty [to do justice] more seriously than state
prosecutors as a whole"). Many academic commentators, particularly those who have served as Assistant
United States Attorneys, when they write about issues in criminal prosecution typically confine their discussion
to the federal prosecutorial system.
236. See STEWART,supra note 178, at 354-55 (quoting Whitney North Seymour, U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York).
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so, the good prosecutor, after careful analysis and active preparation, will
have no reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt and may appropriately pursue
the case vigorously and fairly. When he is not sure of the truth, and has a
reasonable doubt, he should attempt to resolve the doubt. If he is unable to do
so, and no alternative course of action is reasonably available, then the only
proper course is to dismiss the case, however difficult that action might be.
Insisting on prosecuting the case presents an unacceptable risk that an
innocent person will be convicted.
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